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Abstract 
The pivot of this thesis is F.W.J. Schelling’s (1775-1854) proposition that Nature is to be 
conceived as visible Spirit, and Spirit as invisible Nature. In light of Schelling’s 
distinction, this thesis will attempt to restate the purposes of Schelling’s 
Naturephilosophy and transcendental idealism in light of one another. My contention is 
that Schelling’s early philosophy is generally concerned with the nature of manifestation 
and specifically with the manifestation of the Absolute according to the dual aspects of 
Nature and Spirit. Schelling explains manifestation as a process or transition from a state 
of infinite activity or productivity to finite product. To demonstrate this point, I will 
consider Schelling’s ideas, first, on the possibility and manifestation of Nature (Chapter I) 
and, second, on the possibility and manifestation of Spirit (Chapter II). In exploring the 
former, I will concentrate on the First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature 
(1799); in terms of the latter, I will focus on the System of Transcendental Idealism 
(1800). Grounding my interpretation in Schelling’s proposition concerning the visibility 
and invisibility of Nature and Spirit, in the Conclusion I will interpret Nature and Spirit as 
inverted identities, i.e. as a bond of opposing organic and spiritual potencies, and outline 
how each identity is directed toward manifesting the Absolute according to its own inner 
necessity. By interpreting Nature and Spirit in this way, I attempt to show that their 
purposes are to manifest their counterpart as an expression of the Absolute—the 
underlying original identity. 
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1. Introduction 
The Inverted Identities of the Absolute: Of Nature and Spirit 
 
 
For we wish not that nature coincide accidentally with the laws of our spirit (for instance through 
the mediation of a third principle), but that nature itself necessarily and originally not only 
express, but itself realize the laws of our spirit, and that it be nature and be called nature only to 
the extent that it does this. Nature shall be visible spirit, and spirit invisible nature. Here in the 
absolute identity of spirit within us and nature outside us the problem of how a nature outside us is 
possible must be solved1. 
–F.W.J. Schelling (1797) 
 
The pivot of this thesis is F.W.J. Schelling’s (1775-1854) proposition that Nature is to be 
conceived as visible Spirit, and Spirit as invisible Nature2. In light of Schelling’s 
distinction, this thesis will attempt to restate the purposes of Schelling’s 
Naturephilosophy and transcendental idealism in light of one another. My contention is 
that Schelling’s early philosophy is generally concerned with the nature of manifestation 
and specifically with the manifestation of the Absolute according to the dual aspects of 
Nature and Spirit. Schelling explains manifestation as a process or transition from a state 
of infinite activity or productivity to finite product. To demonstrate this point, I will 
consider Schelling’s ideas, first, on the possibility and manifestation of Nature (Chapter I) 
and, second, on the possibility and manifestation of Spirit (Chapter II). In exploring the 
former, I will concentrate on the First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature 
(1799)3; in terms of the latter, I will focus on the System of Transcendental Idealism 
                                                
1 F.W.J. Schelling, “Introduction to Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This 
Science, Second Edition 1803,” trans. Priscilla Hayden-Roy. In Fichte, Jacobi, and Schelling: Philosophy 
of German Idealism, ed. Ernst Behler (New York: The Continuum Publishing Company, 1987), 202. 
2 Ibid. 
3 F.W.J. Schelling, First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature, trans. Keith R. Peterson (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 2004). 
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(1800) 4. Grounding my interpretation in Schelling’s proposition concerning the visibility 
and invisibility of Nature and Spirit, I will interpret Nature and Spirit as inverted 
identities, i.e. as a bond of opposing organic and spiritual potencies, and outline how each 
identity is directed toward manifesting the Absolute according to its own inner necessity. 
By interpreting Nature and Spirit in this way, I attempt to show that their purposes are to 
manifest their counterpart as an expression of the Absolute—the underlying original 
identity. I thus argue that Schelling’s early philosophy represents a theory in which the 
objective and the subjective are both necessary for the possibilities of self and world. 
As will be explored, that which defines Nature as such also defines Spirit, albeit in 
inverse proportion5; they are, in a sense, inverse productivities inclined toward 
manifestation from opposite ontological trajectories: from the objective to the subjective 
in Nature’s case, and from the subjective to the objective in Spirit’s case. It is as if each 
one—Nature and Spirit—must ground itself in an ontologico-epistemological aspect—
either subjectivity or objectivity—in order to manifest. Furthermore, because Nature and 
Spirit begin in objectivity and subjectivity, respectively, and move toward manifesting the 
opposite, both are to be understood as in one sense visible and in another sense invisible, 
depending on the perspective from which they are considered. From the vantage point of 
Nature, Spirit, or the self, is a derivation of Nature; it is Nature’s product. Inversely, from 
the vantage point of Spirit, Nature is the product of the former’s odyssey to seek itself 
through three distinct “epochs6.” The purpose of defining Nature and Spirit as inverted 
                                                
4 F.W.J. Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, trans. Peter Heath (Charlottesville: University Press 
of Virginia, 1978). 
5 Schelling, “Introduction to Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature,” 202. 
6 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, 232. 
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identities is twofold. First, I believe it shows that Schelling’s early philosophy is 
primarily concerned with the possibility and nature of manifestation, as both 
Naturephilosophy and transcendental idealism are grounded in a base productivity which 
seeks to make itself a product. In effect, Schelling outlines the process and possibility of 
manifestation from two different perspectives; in so doing, he effectively constructs two 
seemingly disparate philosophies. Hence the second purpose in arguing that Nature and 
Spirit are inverted identities: to explore the possibility that although disparate and 
constructed separately, Naturephilosophy and transcendental idealism compose a working 
unity, which, I contend, Schelling tries to work out, if only in outline, in his 1801 treatise, 
Presentation of My System of Philosophy. If the goal of Schelling’s early philosophy is to 
identify the necessary conditions for the possibility of the Absolute’s manifestation, then 
Schelling understands the process as one in which invisible things become visible and 
visible things are somehow rendered invisible, again, according to the aspects of Nature 
and Spirit. In this respect, the early philosophies represent an overarching theory of the 
conditions for the possibility of organic and spiritual transmutation. This is what makes 
Schelling’s early philosophy fundamentally transcendental; it is concerned with 
articulating the conditions for the possibility of Nature and Spirit, not with the empirical 
world as such. 
In the year 1801, Johann Fichte (1762-1814) wrote to Schelling regarding one of 
the latter’s recent publications on idealism: “[...] your claim in the Philosophische 
Journal concerning two philosophies, one idealistic, one realistic, both of which are true, 
and could stand next to one another, which I immediately opposed because I saw it to be 
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wrong, lead me to think that you had not penetrated the Wissenschaftslehre7.” As Fichte 
identifies, by 1801 Schelling had undertaken a philosophical project concerned with two 
primary objects of inquiry: on one hand, Nature, constructed through what Schelling 
called Naturephilosophy (Naturphilosophie in German), and, on the other, the self and 
Spirit, constructed through transcendental idealism (alternatively, ideal-realism). Both 
philosophies begin from a postulate of unconditioned productivity. As such, productivity 
is the postulate of Schelling’s early philosophy in toto; as we will see, it drives the 
emergence and development of both natural and spiritual systems. Furthermore, the 
concept of productivity is necessary, ontologically and epistemologically, in order to 
account for how a product or object is possible both materially and ideally given its 
origination from infinite activity.  
In seeking material and ideal conditions, Schelling’s principal philosophical 
concern is the problem of how the infinite is connected with the finite. The transition of 
the infinite to the finite is to be understood as a process both of manifestation and 
transmutation8; and the notion of inversion underlying the relation between Nature and 
Spirit suggests that during the transition of the infinite what is invisible becomes visible 
and, conversely, what is visible is made invisible. For Schelling, visibility means not 
merely becoming physically and materially manifest or real (the invisible becoming 
visible) but becoming transcendentally known as well (the visible becoming invisible). As 
this thesis will outline in Chapters I and II, the dynamic process which produces the 
                                                
7 Dalia Nassar, “From a Philosophy of Self to a Philosophy of Nature: Goethe and the Development of 
Schelling’s Naturephilosophy,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 92 (3) (2010): 305. 
8 F.W.J. Schelling, “Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism,” In The Unconditional in Human 
Knowledge: Four Early Essays (1794-1796), trans. Fritz Marti (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 
1980), 177. 
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Absolute’s manifestation, both as Nature and Spirit, occurs through distinct “stages” or 
“epochs,” considered schematically. Ontologically, these stages or epochs are 
simultaneous and overlapping, defining both Nature and Spirit as networks of 
interdependent forces or potencies. Thus, relating Naturephilosophy to transcendental 
idealism, Nature appears as a visible manifestation of Spirit, and Spirit is revealed 
through Nature’s objectivity. Furthermore, the bond between Nature and Spirit is revealed 
with particular potency in the form and disposition of human being. Through human 
being, Nature and Spirit coordinate themselves toward manifesting and understanding 
things seen and unseen, things visible and invisible. Schelling thus asserts that as a part of 
Nature the human being signifies the moment of reflection in which Nature comes to 
know itself as Spirit, and Spirit knows itself as Nature. This process is really undertaken 
in the name of the Absolute. For this reason, the human being appears as a kind of 
instrument of the Absolute, a cycling of ideal and real potencies which, at times, reveal 
but also conceal the nature of the Absolute (Identity). 
Nature and Spirit’s respective productivities are not to be understood as industrial 
or anthropomorphic, seeking a particular purpose (telos) beyond manifestation; their basic 
purpose is to manifest aspects of the Absolute. As we will explore, because all products 
are only approximations of the Absolute, Nature and Spirit are inwardly and outwardly 
directed toward the goal (telos) of manifestation. To an extent then, this thesis gestures 
toward a middle ground, an invisible point of convergence, between Naturephilosophy 
and transcendental idealism. In so doing, it seeks to identify a unity between the two 
while, at the same time, attempts to honour the paradox that the two philosophies, as they 
are separately articulated, appear along parallel axes that may never intersect. Schelling’s 
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dictum that Nature be visible Spirit and Spirit invisible Nature preserves an ineffaceable 
difference between the two, which claims that neither can properly exist without the 
other. The implication of Schelling’s twofold philosophy thus seems to be that through 
the material manifestation of Nature, Spirit acquires a concrete vessel—a spatiotemporal 
location—in which to emerge and in which to remain contained and expressed9. 
Secondly, the self and self-consciousness account for the emergence of Nature’s dormant, 
latent and unconscious potency. Thus two perspectives on the Absolute emerge, which 
remain in permanent tension with one another, contradicting and complementing one 
another. Perhaps then Nature and Spirit should be grasped, as I believe Schelling 
intended, as inverted identities, or inverted potencies, existing in contrary proportions of 
potency. This means that each one has a share in the task of manifesting the Absolute—
the infinite revealed in the finite. And although both Nature and Spirit seem to 
accomplish this on their own terms, i.e. from objectivity to subjectivity in the case of 
Nature and from subjectivity to objectivity in the case of Spirit, the one is not possible 
without the other; a trace of the other is contained in each one. The postulate of 
productivity coupled with the law of polarity, or dialectic, define Nature’s realizing 
productivity and Spirit’s idealizing productivity. Furthermore, these mutually-occurring 
processes require two different philosophical approaches, namely Naturephilosophy and 
transcendental idealism, in order to properly recount the story, as far as philosophy is able 
to tell it, of the Absolute’s becoming in the forms of Nature and Spirit. It is important to 
bear in mind that because Schelling’s early philosophy is transcendental in orientation it 
                                                
9 Bruce Matthews, Schelling’s Organic Form of Philosophy: Life as the Schema of Freedom (Albany: State 
University of New York, 2011), 125. 
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seeks to account for the reality of Nature and Spirit as possibility. Thus, as was stated at 
the beginning of this introduction, Schelling’s early philosophy is concerned with the a 
priori conditions or first principles for the possibility of Nature and Spirit. Thus, when 
this thesis discusses an actual or external world, it means that which is necessary for the 
possibility of world. 
An outline of the thesis follows. In Chapter I, I outline in some detail Schelling’s 
conception of Nature as unconditioned productivity, focusing on the transition of Nature’s 
infinite activity (natura naturans) to Nature’s finitude in the form of organic products and 
phenomena (natura naturata). I present Schelling’s conception of Nature as a kind of 
process or continuous sequence through which infinite productivity is transformed into 
finite product—moving from objectivity to subjectivity and culminating with the product 
of human self-consciousness. This process comprises approximately seven distinct 
“stages” or “phases” which occur simultaneously, producing phenomena in dynamic, 
teleological fashion. I argue that Nature’s manifestation is grounded in three conditions of 
which the first is also the postulate of Naturephilosophy: 1) the postulate and condition of 
unconditionedness of Nature, or unconditioned activity; 2) the condition of the law of 
polarity; and 3) the condition of the actant or potency. In Chapter II, I make the argument 
that Spirit’s odyssey toward self-consciousness and self-knowledge mirrors the 
manifestation of Nature, albeit from the vantage point of the absolute self, moving from a 
state of unconsciousness to consciousness to self-consciousness. For Schelling, the self 
progresses toward a deeper sense of itself by passing through three “epochs”; throughout 
this process, Nature is posited by the self as another power against which the self strives 
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in order to bring forth (manifest) its own inner necessity10. Similar to Nature, I argue that 
Spirit’s manifestation is grounded in four conditions of which the first is also the 
postulate of transcendental idealism: 1) the postulate and condition of unconditionedness 
of Spirit, or eternal becoming (the self as activity); 2) the condition of the dialectic of self 
and not-self, or the freedom and necessity of the self; 3) the condition of the twofold 
series of actions, the necessary and the free; and 4) the condition of the epochs of 
selfhood (the Odyssey of Spirit). In the Conclusion, I will explain why Nature and Spirit 
should be conceived as inverted identities relative to one another and consider the 
complementarity of Naturephilosophy and transcendental idealism by looking briefly at 
Schelling’s treatise Presentation of My System of Philosophy (1801). Finally, an appendix 
has been included which presents a brief comparison of Schelling’s philosophy with that 
of G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831). 
 
1.1 Schelling’s Philosophical Career and a Review of Recent Scholarship in English 
 
Before we move into the body of the thesis, a brief look at the stages of Schelling’s 
philosophical career may assist the reader in situating the present work; to this end, a 
literature review of seven titles of English scholarship on Schelling is presented. Finally, I 
have also included a note on why I decided to focus on Schelling’s early philosophy. 
Historically, Schelling has often been received and interpreted as no more than a 
stepping stone between the Subjective Idealism of Johann Fichte and the Absolute 
Idealism of G.W.F. Hegel11. This position tends to downplay Schelling’s influence on 
                                                
10 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, 29. 
11 Andrew Bowie, Schelling and Modern European Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 1993), 1. 
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Hegel and fails to treat Schelling’s philosophy in itself reading it only in reference to 
other philosophers. Moreover, the position that Schelling was only an intermediary 
between Fichte and Hegel limits Schelling to a brief period of his long philosophical 
career, which spanned more than 60 years beginning roughly in 1793 and ending only 
with his death in 1854. Schelling’s broader philosophical career has been ignored in part 
because he was early on passed off as a protean thinker, never one to close and complete 
a full philosophical system12. Hegel himself wrote, “Schelling worked out his philosophy 
in view of the public […] If we ask for a final work in which we shall find his philosophy 
represented with complete definiteness none such can be named13.” This passage in itself 
does not dismiss Schelling’s contribution to the history of philosophy but it gives some 
indication of how Schelling’s philosophy was eventually regarded and why until the 20th 
Century it was largely ignored, especially in the English-speaking world. It is true that 
Schelling never completed a philosophical system; however, it is demonstrably the case 
that Schelling consistently explored and questioned certain themes, leitmotifs and ideas, 
which recur throughout his corpus. These include polarity, identity, Nature, Spirit, the 
Absolute, realism and idealism, as well as the relation between the infinite and the finite. 
Schelling’s approach to and thinking of these themes and ideas varied over the course of 
his philosophical career; in order to demarcate these variations scholars have tended to 
divide Schelling’s philosophical work into different periods. 
Opinions of the number of periods in Schelling’s philosophy differ, as do 
interpretations of what defines each period and how each one should be read both in itself 
                                                
12 Ibid., 4. 
13 G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Volume Three, ed. and trans. E.S. Haldane 
and Frances H. Simson, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968), 513. 
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and in relation to the others. However, the dominant opinion, or at least most established, 
traceable to Manfred Schröter14, is that Schelling’s philosophy should be divided into and 
interpreted according to three periods: the early, middle and late. The early Schelling, 
spanning from 1793 to 1806, includes writings influenced by Fichte’s philosophy, 
especially the latter’s concept of the self, the philosophy of nature designated in German 
as Naturphilosophie, transcendental idealism and the Identity-philosophy 
(Identitätphilosophie). The middle Schelling, spanning from 1806 to 1821, is often 
qualified as a “philosophy of freedom” and shows a marked turn toward theological and 
theosophical concepts, as well as a greater concern for a kind of realism grounded in 
existence rather than in a priori principles of knowledge. The middle period is typically 
identified as beginning in 1806, which is when Schelling moved from Würzburg to 
Munich and where he met the Christian theosophist Franz von Baader (1765-1841). 
However, there are some signs of the middle period as early as 1804, when Schelling 
published his treatise Philosophy and Religion in which he redefines the finite as a 
falling-away (Abfall) from the infinite15 and shows a newfound interest in the religious. 
Finally, the late Schelling, spanning 1821 to the philosopher’s death in 1854, includes an 
attack on Hegel through Schelling’s formulation of what he called “positive philosophy.” 
The latter is contrasted with Hegel’s philosophy, as well as Schelling’s own early 
philosophy, both of which are qualified as “negative philosophies.” In brief, positive 
philosophy attempts to make an account of being from within existence, i.e. beginning 
                                                
14 S.J. McGrath, The Dark Ground of Spirit: Schelling and the Unconscious (New York: Routledge, 2012), 
38n1. 
15 F.W.J. Schelling, Philosophy and Religion (1804), trans. Klaus Ottmann, (Putnam: Spring Publications, 
2010), 26. 
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from the real, rather than from principles and concepts. Alternatively, we might say, 
while negative philosophy attempts to construct reality and the Absolute from the a 
priori, positive philosophy takes as its starting point the a posteriori. The positive 
philosophy also included a Philosophy of Revelation and a Philosophy of Mythology, 
which, during Schelling’s lifetime, were presented publicly as lectures at the University 
of Berlin where Schelling was called in 1842 and where he remained until 1846. 
Schelling’s philosophy has received greater attention in the last 20 to 30 years 
with a resurgence of materialistic metaphysics, notably in the forms of Speculative 
Realism and Materialism. Moreover, Gilles Deleuze’s (1925-1995) move away from 
transcendental approaches to philosophy has also been particularly influential in this 
regard, as has Iain Hamilton Grant’s book Philosophies of Nature After Schelling16, 
published in 2006. Both Deleuze and Grant’s philosophical work highlight how some 
contemporary trends in philosophy draw from natural science, especially biology, 
chemistry and geology, and how an investigation of Nature, in particular, is not in fact an 
impediment to the ever-demanding questions concerning first principles. A brief review 
of some secondary sources on Schelling follows, which may be helpful to the reader; all 
works mentioned below are recommended and worth investigating further. 
First, Robert F. Brown’s book The Later Philosophy of Schelling: The Influence of 
Boehme on the Works of 1809-181517, published in 1977, has made an inestimable 
contribution to the field of Schelling studies, although it might have been more aptly 
titled, “The Middle Philosophy of Schelling,” given the dominant interpretation of 
                                                
16 Iain Hamilton Grant, Philosophies of Nature After Schelling (New York: Continuum, 2006). 
17 Robert F. Brown, The Later Philosophy of Schelling: The Influence of Boehme on the Works of 1809-
1815 (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1977). 
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Schelling’s philosophical periods mentioned above. Still, the work clearly demonstrates 
the deep impact reading Jacob Boehme (1575-1624) had on Schelling. It traces Boehme’s 
theosophy throughout Schelling’s middle period works, especially the treatise 
Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom and Matters Connected 
Therewith (1809) and the drafts of The Ages of the World (1811-1815). 
It is arguable that Andrew Bowie sparked the English retrieval of Schelling in 
1993 with the publication of his book Schelling and Modern European Philosophy: An 
Introduction18. In this work, Bowie explores the logical rigour of Schelling’s philosophy, 
arguing that Schelling is not plagued by irrationalism or a lack of logic but that he is in 
fact a strict logician who insists on the inviolability of the law of non-contradiction. 
Bowie also explores certain parallelisms between Schelling and 20th Century Analytic 
Philosophy.  
Since 1993, several other books have bolstered English studies of Schelling, two 
of which were published in 1996: Dale E. Snow’s Schelling and the End of Idealism19 and 
Slavoj Žižek’s The Indivisible Remainder: On Schelling and Related Matters20. Snow’s 
book attempts to cover the whole of Schelling’s philosophy, ranging from the early 
Fichtian writings to the later Philosophy of Mythology. Given the extensive range of her 
subject matter, Snow’s exploration is not as specific as the other studies featured here; 
however, Snow is an attentive reader and interpreter and is aware of Schelling’s historical 
context and of what is at stake in each period of his thought. In this respect, Snow’s book 
is a great achievement and an excellent introduction to Schelling. Taking a different 
                                                
18 Bowie, Schelling and Modern European Philosophy. 
19 Dale E. Snow, Schelling and the End of Idealism (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996). 
20 Slavoj Žižek, The Indivisible Remainder: On Schelling and Related Matters (New York: Verso, 1996). 
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approach, Slavoj Žižek reads Schelling psychologically drawing mostly from Schelling’s 
middle period. Žižek interprets Schelling’s philosophy as a proto-form of Jacques Lacan’s 
psychoanalysis. Because Žižek focuses primarily on the development of the [human] 
subject, he reduces Schelling’s narrative of divine drives and potencies to the level of the 
subjective. Effectively, he dismisses the theological content of Schelling’s thinking as 
merely an analogy for the emergence of selfhood. As such, Žižek’s reading is 
controversial but also original and provocative. 
In 2011, Bruce Matthews’ book Schelling’s Organic Form of Philosophy: Life as 
the Schema of Freedom21 was published. This book succeeds in showing the extent to 
which Schelling was influenced by Plato, 18th Century German Speculative Pietism, in 
particular Friedrich Christoph Oetinger (1702-1782), and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). 
The book primarily explores how Schelling exploited Plato’s metaphysics, as presented in 
the Timaeus and Philebus, as part of his reorientation of Kant’s epistemology and critical 
philosophy overall. Matthews argues that Schelling’s goal was to discover the Urform 
(Primordial Form) of philosophy and thereby to set out the principles that determine both 
Nature and Spirit. By extension, Matthews looks at the legacy of Pietism in Schelling’s 
thought, especially the notion that Nature is the divine made external; Nature is a kind of 
divine body. A more than passing familiarity with Plato and Kant is necessary in order to 
grasp the full extent of Matthews’ argument. 
Finally, S. J. McGrath also offers a psychological reading of Schelling in his book 
The Dark Ground of Spirit: Schelling and the Unconscious22, published in 2012. 
                                                
21 Matthews, Schelling’s Organic Form. 
22 McGrath, Dark Ground. 
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Committed to the complementary ends of reading Schelling on his own terms while 
taking him into new and unexplored territory, McGrath traces the concept of the 
unconscious, as well as forms of depth psychology, to Schelling’s philosophy. He then 
argues that Schelling’s notion of the unconscious extends beyond the confines of the 
subject; it is that which undergirds and connects opposed elements of reality, such as the 
objective and the subjective, Nature and Spirit, matter and mind. The unconscious is, 
therefore, not merely the source of subjective desire and identity but is situated outside of 
consciousness; it is a sign of transcendence and of the creative power present throughout 
the manifest world. Following this line of thinking, McGrath sees aspects of Carl Jung’s 
Analytic Psychology as continuous with Schelling’s [dissociative] psychology.  
Returning to the central topic, there are two distinct ontologico-epistemological 
narratives within Schelling’s early philosophy, circa 1799 to 1801. The first is 
Naturephilosophy, constructed from the standpoint of Nature, and is characterized as the 
natural history of consciousness. The second is transcendental idealism, developed from 
the perspective of the self, and is formulated as the stages the self passes through en route 
to self-consciousness. To fuse them as a single narrative would be to lose what is original 
to Schelling, i.e. the binocular perspective of the Absolute. Despite the fact that these 
philosophical narratives must remain independent of one another, Schelling states that 
they must also be placed together, alongside one another as opposite poles23. Two 
questions thus emerge: First, what do Naturephilosophy and transcendental idealism 
consist of in themselves, i.e. in isolation of one another? Second, how should we 
                                                
23 F.W.J. Schelling, “F.W.J. Schelling: Presentation of My System of Philosophy (1801),” trans. Michael G. 
Vater, The Philosophical Forum 32 (4) (2001): 344-45. 
15 
 
understand the polar, even magnetic, relation of the two philosophies? The first question 
is answered in chapters I and II, which present expositions of Naturephilosophy and 
transcendental idealism, respectively. As such, the two chapters are works of historical 
and philosophical understanding and serve as the basis for addressing the second question 
in the Conclusion.  
In answer to the question, “Why focus on the early Schelling?” my response is 
because this is when Schelling was already making novel contributions to the history of 
philosophy, in particular his emphasis on the philosophy of nature. More specifically, the 
early Schelling demands a focused reading precisely because of the ever-present tension 
that exists between Naturephilosophy and transcendental idealism. In effect, Schelling 
affirms both autonomous, free Nature and the freedom of a synthesizing subject and then 
proceeds to construct philosophies in which each one is either the subject or the object. In 
order to accomplish these constructions, Schelling embraced a logic comprised of 
polarized opposites which are always inextricably connected with one another24. 
Schelling extends this dualistic thinking leading him to affirm seemingly opposed 
approaches to philosophy, not merely in terms of Nature and transcendental philosophies 
but also the later negative and positive philosophies. In a sense then, the very form of 
Schelling’s [early] philosophy, i.e. the fact that there are two philosophies, recapitulates 
the content of his philosophy, i.e. the fact that there are always two elements at play with 
one another, e.g. Nature and Spirit, object and subject, the real and the ideal. Thus, my 
                                                
24 McGrath refers to Schelling’s logic as a kind of “aporia” with reference to a Platonic influence: “Socratic 
aporia forces the interlocutors to move from the ideal to the real, from the merely theoretical consideration 
of possibilities, of essence, to the judgment which is an act of the person, risking himself on whatever he 
believes to be the truth of the matter […].” S.J. McGrath, “The question concerning metaphysics: a 
Schellingian intervention in analytical psychology,” International Journal of Jungian Studies (2013): 21, 
accessed August 1, 2013, doi: 10.1080/19409052.2013.795183.   
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original notion of inverted identities, to be presented and discussed in the Conclusion, 
may provide deeper insights into the whole of Schelling’s philosophical corpus. For the 
time being these insights will have to wait as the early philosophy is the focus of this 
thesis. There is much scholarly work still to be done on Schelling, especially in English; it 
is my hope that this thesis represents a first step in contributing to the future of Schelling 
studies. 
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2. Chapter I 
Schelling’s Naturephilosophy: On the Transmutation of Nature 
 
 
Our ancestors admired the economy of nature. She was thought to have a practical character, 
inclined to do much with small means where others produce little with great means. As mere 
mortals, we stand even more in admiration of the skill with which she is able to produce the 
widest variety of things while restricted to only a few basic principles… Whatever appears in the 
world must divide if it is to appear at all. What has been divided seeks itself again, can return to 
itself and reunite. This happens in a lower sense when it merely intermingles with its opposite, 
combines with it; here the phenomenon is nullified or at least neutralized. However, the union 
may occur in a higher sense if what has been divided is first intensified; then in the union of the 
intensified halves it will produce a third thing, something new, higher, unexpected25. 
—Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, “Polarity” 
 
 
Nature admittedly makes no leap; but it seems to me that this principle is much misunderstood if 
we try to bring it into a single class of things which Nature has not only separated, but has herself 
opposed to one another. That principle says no more than this, that nothing which comes to be in 
Nature comes to be by a leap; all becoming occurs in a continuous sequence. But it by no means 
follows from this that everything which exists is for that reason continuously connected—that 
there should also be no leap between what exists. From everything that is, therefore, nothing has 
become without steady progression, a steady transition from one state to another26. 
–F.W.J. Schelling (1797) 
 
In Schelling’s First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature (1799), he writes of 
the transition of the infinite to the finite in the following passage: “The chief problem of 
the philosophy of nature is not to explain the active in Nature (for because it is its first 
supposition, this is quite conceivable to it), but the resting, permanent. Nature philosophy 
arrives at this explanation simply by virtue of the presupposition that for Nature the 
permanent is a limitation of its own activity27.” Here, Schelling identifies this chapter’s 
fundamental concern: the nature and relation of Nature’s primordial productivity to its 
                                                
25 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, “Polarity,” in Scientific Studies, ed. and trans. Douglas Miller (New York, 
NY: Suhrkamp Publishers, 1988), 155-56. 
26 F.W.J. Schelling, Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature as Introduction to the Study of This Science, trans. 
Errol E. Harris and Peter Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 133-34. 
27 Schelling, First Outline, 17. 
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product. At a particular level of Nature’s potency and through a series of dynamic stages, 
life and mind are produced. Each stage represents a necessary ingredient to the recipe of 
organic life. The process can be broken down into the following set of seven stages, all of 
which occur and recur simultaneously: 1) Diremption: the division of Nature’s potencies 
from an original state of indifference; 2) Interaction: at least two potencies engage one 
another, stirring activity and conditioning the possibility of the composition of organic 
matter; 3) Inhibition: the organic product is produced through the interaction of universal 
Nature’s activity and a counterforce of inhibition, which restricts and slows the originally 
uninhibited activity of universal Nature; 4) Appearance: in which the potencies’ 
interaction produces an eddy-like appearance, composed of primordial matter; 5) 
Solicitation: the organic product remains solicitous of Nature’s activity, continuously 
drawing on its seemingly inexhaustible reservoir of potency; 6) Incorporation: the forces 
of Nature become the organic product itself; and finally, 7) Regulation: an inward and 
architectonic principle governs the organism’s material form and order which constitute it 
qua organic life; in other words, it continuously reproduces itself as a product in Nature. 
This “seven stages” interpretation is my original reading of Schelling’s Naturephilosophy 
and thus represents a novel contribution to the field of Schelling studies; moreover, it is 
worth noting that the division of production into a set of seven stages applies equally well 
to Spirit. Throughout Nature’s productive process, its forces are transformed from pure 
[raw] uninhibited activity into the matter, form and order of organism. The stages are not 
sequent, but interdependent and simultaneous. The goal of this chapter is to outline how 
Schelling accounts for the possibility of the organic product from the postulate of 
Nature’s infinite productivity. 
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2.1 The Postulate and First Condition: The Unconditionedness of Nature 
Schelling’s Naturephilosophy aims to reinvigorate philosophy’s conceptualization of 
Nature by overwriting the idea that Nature is static and determined and affirm in its place 
Nature as activity or productivity28. Frederick Beiser describes the fundamental program 
of Schelling’s Naturephilosophy as an attempt “to explain life and the mind on a 
naturalistic yet nonmechanistic foundation29.” Part of Schelling’s project is to show how 
Nature is responsible for the emergence of phenomena, arguing that this process is not the 
by-product of subjectivity’s inherent drive to construct coherence and experience from 
what is actually a formless mass of chaotic activity. We should note, however, that from 
one perspective Schelling is trying to have his cake and eat it too; there is a paradox at 
work in Schelling’s philosophy. The paradox is that there is both autonomous Nature and 
a synthesizing subject. Schelling conceives of Nature as free and independent of 
subjectivity; at the same time, he affirms the need for transcendental philosophy and its 
basis in subjective synthesis. Schelling emphasizes that from the standpoint of Nature, 
real and actual products are produced; they are not mere appearances or phantasms of the 
mind. Schelling advances this philosophical position by ascribing “unconditionedness” to 
Nature, i.e. by regarding Nature as originally absolutely active30. The state of 
unconditionedness is thus to be grasped as the postulate of Naturephilosophy; it 
represents the starting point from which to think Nature as infinite activity. Whereas 
universal Nature is unconditioned, organic nature is conditioned. In light of this 
                                                
28 Ibid., 14-15. 
29 Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism 1781-1801 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2002), 508. 
30 Schelling, First Outline, 15. 
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distinction, the aim of Naturephilosophy can be formulated in the following way: to 
understand the place of the conditioned product (organic nature) within the horizon of 
unconditioned productivity (universal Nature). 
The postulate of unconditionedness accomplishes two ends. First, it allows 
Schelling to conceive of Nature as a dynamic reality in contrast to the Enlightenment’s 
conception of Nature as static and mechanical. Second, the unconditionedness of Nature 
grounds the possibility of an original diremption necessary to explain the manifest 
world’s generation from an originary source of pure potentiality. On this basis, Schelling 
is able to conceive of Nature as dynamic, creative and purposive. Among the Germans, 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) was one of the first to develop a dynamic theory of Nature, 
as is suggested first by the third analogy of experience in the Critique of Pure Reason 
(1781), and then outlined to a greater extent in the Critique of Judgment (1790). In the 
latter, Kant’s idea of Nature is based on the reciprocal-dynamic causality necessary to the 
formation of biological organisms, rather than limited to a mechanical description. 
Timothy Lenoir points out that Kant’s revised conception of Nature, found in his Third 
Critique, is based in part on recognizing the “special character of organic phenomena31.” 
Following Johann Blumenbach (1752-1840) to some extent, Kant seeks to unify the 
mechanical with the teleological in order to construct a more complete and, therefore, a 
more scientific account of Nature. The gap between the mechanical and the teleological is 
due to the inherent linearity of mechanical explanations; they describe causality 
exclusively according to linear series of causes and effects: A leads to B leads to C and so 
                                                
31 Timothy Lenoir, The Strategy of Life: Teleology and Mechanics in Nineteenth Century German Biology 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 24. 
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on. There is no reflexivity to a mechanical theory, nor is there the possibility that B or C 
might in fact also be the cause of A, which is possible according to a teleological series32. 
The argument, as Lenoir points out, is that A cannot exist without C, just as C cannot 
exist without A; they are reciprocally dependent. In this respect, A is both the cause and 
the effect of C33. Moreover, teleology posits the notion of a final cause—an end to which 
the organism is directed by virtue of its original nature or essence. For example, a flower 
cannot help but be a flower. The manifestation of its form is not pre-determined; there is 
always the possibility of spontaneous rupture or change, meaning that the growth and the 
bloom of the flower are not guaranteed. But the form of the flower is in some sense 
already determined; its manifestation occurs or does not occur within the limits of that 
form.  
Schelling works within this tradition that seeks to unify mechanism and teleology, 
although his sense of natural teleology is different from Kant’s. Kant believed that 
teleological explanations of Nature were merely regulative, i.e. merely subjective 
guidelines or principles through which the human being understands the formation and 
life of physical and biological Nature; thus the dynamism of Kant’s philosophy of Nature 
is not reflective of Nature in itself but is imposed upon it by mind—laying a sheet of 
order (the determinate) over a bed of chaos (the indeterminate)34. Thus, according to 
                                                
32 Ibid., 25. 
33 Ibid. 
34 As readers and interpreters of Schelling’s philosophy, we must remember that Schelling does not deny 
subjective synthesis; rather he presents it as an effect of Nature’s autonomy and productivity. Kant’s 
transcendental subject is present in Schelling’s Naturphilosophy; it is generated out of Nature. As such, the 
subject is a product of Nature at the same time that it is a necessary condition for knowledge of Nature; 
more precisely, the subject is the necessary condition for Nature to know itself: the self is Nature knowing 
itself as such. 
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Kant, the faculty of understanding is the “lawgiver of nature35.” In contrast, Schelling 
treats teleological laws as constitutive, i.e. the dynamism of Nature is constructed by mind 
out of its interaction with an actually dynamic and systematic realm unto itself. Thus the 
frameworks and ideas attributed to Nature are signs of an objective reality not necessarily 
dependent on human subjectivity and the order of mind; Nature, in a sense, has its own 
purpose and intentionality. Lenoir points out that there are five key features of Romantic 
biological theories: 1) polarity; 2) unity; 3) metamorphosis; 4) ideal types; and 5) 
structure of the system of Nature36. As we will see in the course of this chapter, all five of 
these features appear to some degree in Schelling’s Naturephilosophy. Mechanism does 
not assume such notions as unity, purpose and end; these are teleological concepts. Yet in 
observing Nature the human being is struck by the sense that each of these qualities is 
part of the truth of Nature. Frederick Coplestone writes that Nature’s identity is revealed 
through its teleological pattern, “not through its reduction to human ideas37.” In order to 
uncover Nature’s identity, so to speak, Schelling employs teleology as a necessary part of 
his philosophical approach. 
Nature’s externalization—from productivity to product—is presented as a process 
beginning from the unconditioned manifesting as the conditioned. It is a story of the 
genesis of phenomena, or the transition of the infinite to the finite. In his 1803 
introduction to the second edition of his treatise, Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an 
                                                
35 Kant as quoted by Lenoir, Strategy, 27. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Frederick Coplestone, A History of Philosophy, Vol. VII: Modern Philosophy, from the Post-Kantian 
Idealists to Marx, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche (New York: Image Books, 1994), 113. 
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Introduction to the Study of this Science (1797), Schelling distils the reason why all 
philosophy must be grounded in Nature: 
Man was not born to waste his spiritual force battling against the phantasms of an 
imagined world, but rather to exercise all his forces over against a world that has 
influence on him, that lets him feel its power, and upon which he can reciprocally 
act. Thus no gulf may be fixed between him and the world; contact and 
interaction must be possible between them, for only then will man become 
human38. 
 
Schelling affirms a fundamental division in the human being, between her organic nature 
and spirituality. The latter emerges from the former and, teleologically speaking, is 
destined to realize a particular goal through organic materiality. To this end, Schelling 
posits an objective environment which presents actual points of resistance, all of which 
seem to offer potential aid to the human being in her spiritual odyssey. As we will see 
later on, the gulf between the world and human being is necessary; without it the human 
being would lack the means through which to articulate her inner spiritual purpose (telos). 
If Nature were merely a static realm, an unchanging reality, it could not provide the 
necessary conditions for spiritual growth and transformation (ethics). In order to realize 
this potential, Nature itself must be conceived of as a grand and overarching subject 
characterized by dynamism and freedom. This is the basis for regarding Nature, and the 
whole cosmos, as a World Soul, i.e. as a self-organizing whole defined by the unity of 
necessity and contingency39. Schelling imagines Nature to be capable of freedom, always 
in the process of unfolding and becoming; moreover, he presents a systematic account of 
Nature’s capacity for spontaneous productivity through which self-consciousness and 
Spirit are ultimately made manifest. 
                                                
38 Schelling, “Introduction to Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature,” 169. 
39 Schelling, Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, 35. 
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As noted above, a key distinction of Naturephilosophy is that of universal Nature, 
or its productive character, and Nature’s individual organic products. The product arises 
from the productivity of Nature. It is the result of a complex process in which natural 
potencies are continually solicited. As we will see later in the chapter, these potencies 
form and constitute the product as such. In both his On the World Soul (1798) and First 
Outline (1799), Schelling identifies the beginning of production as the diremption of the 
Absolute40. In 1799, Schelling writes, “The beginning of life is activity; it is a tearing 
loose from universal Nature41.” The first stage in the production of the organic begins 
when a measure of autonomy is introduced into Nature. At this moment, Nature splits into 
two, asserting a part of itself as free and individual42. To accomplish this, a potency in 
Nature turns away from its source, although without completely separating from it. The 
production of organic life thus ensues; it is the intensification of Nature and a movement 
from its original state of indifference and potentiality to a manifest state of difference and 
actuality43. The advent of difference is the advent of life; Nature, in a sense, becomes 
concerned with itself in and through the form of organic life44. Organic nature signifies 
particularity relative to Nature’s universal productivity45. Schelling asserts that universal 
Nature is in “free, constant growth46” and “an infinite process of formation47”; in effect, 
                                                
40 F.W.J. Schelling, “On the World Soul (1798),” trans. Iain Hamilton Grant, Collapse 6 (2010): 316; 
Schelling, First Outline, 65. 
41 Schelling, First Outline, 65. 
42 Ibid. And, repeated, “Life, where it comes into existence, comes against the will of external nature, as it 
were, by a tearing-away from it.” Ibid., 62. 
43 Ibid., 5, 68. 
44 “[…] the individual only exists through the pressure of an external nature.” Ibid., 69. 
45 Grant, Philosophies of Nature, 174. 
46 Thomas F. O’Meara, Romantic Idealism and Roman Catholicism: Schelling and the Theologians (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982), 23. 
47 “The process of formation is nothing other than a configuring.” Schelling, First Outline, 35. 
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every species and individual is a particularization of unconditioned, universal Nature48. 
We might say that the particular is the configuring of the universal; but, as such, it is a 
failed attempt to concretize the universal. The effect of this failure is that manifestations 
recur endlessly, still attempting to express the universal; this point will be analyzed in 
greater detail later in this chapter. After the initial diremption of Nature into separate and 
independent forces, and the ensuing interaction of these forces, the activity of Nature 
transforms and becomes a product through what Schelling calls “inhibition”: “Nature = a 
product which passes from figure to figure—in a certain order to be sure, through which, 
however, it cannot result in determinate products without absolute inhibition of the 
formation49.” Inhibition is the exertion of counterforce, pressure and resistance to the flow 
of Nature’s originally infinite activity50. The quelling of activity against its natural current 
produces a distinct point (the product) around and toward which Nature’s potencies flow 
and accumulate (representing both a qualitative and quantitative change to Nature). The 
emergence of this point produces a relative stability and fixity of powers51; in fact, the 
powers are constantly moving through the point (the product), reproducing it spatially and 
temporally. Inhibition of productivity remains constant, if not permanent52. 
Schelling attempts to work out how the product is possible given that it must 
inhibit the activity of Nature but also allow it. These simultaneous functions are necessary 
in order for the product to continue to draw from Nature—the source of potency. The 
                                                
48 Ibid., 13. 
49 Ibid., 6. 
50 David Farrell Krell, “Three Ends of the Absolute: Schelling on Inhibition, Hölderlin on Separation, and 
Novalis on Density,” Research in Phenomenology 32 (1) (2002): 63. 
51 Bowie, Schelling and Modern European Philosophy, 40. 
52 Universal Nature is formative drive. It is “blind” so long as it is uninhibited, lacking reason or purpose 
(telos). In this sense, universal Nature is unproductive as it is incapable of producing something. Only 
where there is a degree of inhibition of the forces of Nature is Nature properly productive. 
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product is in constant mediation of the activity of Nature; or, perhaps more accurately, the 
product itself is the constant mediation (“becoming-inhibited”53) of Nature’s activity54. 
This process is defined by the tension between composable and decomposable states. 
Products lie in the middle between the absolutely decomposable and the absolutely 
indecomposable55. The balancing act between decomposability and indecomposability 
suggests polarity and a median between the two extremes, necessary in order for the 
conditions of producthood to remain possible. The inclination toward one extreme or the 
other would negate the necessary conditions of relative stability needed for a product to 
exist. It is worth noting that the product emerges according to a certain restriction of form 
depending on its species; the individual product does not freely choose its form56. This 
does not mean, however, that there is no variation within a given species. In fact, because 
of the infinite degrees of proportion of natural potencies, every species contains, if only 
potentially, an infinite number of individuals. The balance between organic potencies 
determines the multiplicity and variety within a particular species. Schelling’s theory 
attempts, therefore, to account for the basic form or archetype of a species, as conceived 
by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s (1749-1832) archetypal theory, but also the myriad 
variations, exceptions and possible deformities of the primal form (Urbild) within that 
same species. In this respect, the theory explains what may be identified as the unity of 
heterogeneous Nature, or how Nature is to be understood as both identity and difference. 
                                                
53 “The product, however, is nothing other than productive Nature itself determined in a certain way; the 
inhibition of the product is, therefore, simultaneously an inhibition of Nature itself; but Nature itself is 
solely active. Therefore, it cannot be inhibited, unless this becoming-inhibited is itself, from another 
perspective, again = to activity.” Schelling, First Outline, 34. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid., 32. 
56 Ibid., 35. 
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2.2 The Second Condition: The Law of Polarity 
Inhibition limits Nature’s primordial activity, causing the finite product to manifest57. 
Without these limits, nothing would be produced, as Schelling observes in the following 
passages: 
If the originally positive were infinite, it would lie entirely beyond the limits of 
all possible perception. Restricted by the oppressing force, it becomes a finite 
magnitude—it begins to be an object of perception, or manifests itself in 
phenomena58. 
 
‘The product is inhibited at a determinate stage of development’ does not mean 
that it absolutely stops being active, but that it is limited with respect to its 
productions; it cannot reproduce anything to infinity except itself. Since it is now 
perpetually active it will be active only for itself, i.e., it will reproduce itself not 
only as individual but simultaneously as genus to infinity59. 
 
Inhibition is not the absolute cessation of activity; rather, it is, as Schelling affirms, a 
counterforce to infinite activity, necessary to the formation and configuration of what 
would otherwise remain merely potential60. The product is, in a manner of speaking, a 
nodal point, i.e. a point of convergence in which Nature’s basic potencies intermix. 
Without such interaction, the product would cease to exist; the product is, therefore, 
dependent on Nature. Thus, in one respect, the relation between Nature and the product is 
heteronymous; universal Nature holds ultimate sway. However, in another respect, the 
organic product is not entirely subservient to Nature; it possesses autonomy. The product 
is a transmuted version or realization of Nature’s potential for productivity, i.e. Nature’s 
capacity to produce something from what is initially only pure activity (pure potentiality). 
 Some measure of autonomy is necessary in order for the product to individualize 
                                                
57 Krell, “Three Ends,” 65. 
58 Schelling, “On the World Soul,” 96. 
59 Schelling, First Outline, 46. 
60 Ibid., 17. 
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itself within Nature. Simultaneously, the organic product’s limited or relative autonomy 
necessarily entails subordination to Nature’s activity, as it is only from out of Nature’s 
activity that an organic product can reproduce itself. Schelling describes the simultaneity 
of heteronomy and autonomy as follows: “Nature achieves its aim in precisely the 
opposite way than the way in which it attempted to achieve it; the activity of life is the 
cause of its own dissolution. It is extinguished as soon as it begins to become independent 
of external nature, i.e., unreceptive to external stimulus, and so life itself is only the 
bridge to death61.” In this passage, Schelling articulates that the source of stimulus, life 
and vitality ultimately also produces exhaustion and death. The original expansion of 
Nature (natura naturans) that generated the individual (natura naturata) inevitably 
contracts to Nature’s infinite activity. Moreover, the passage implies that because Nature 
achieves its intended aim through opposite means “in which it attempted to achieve it,” 
part of Nature’s activity must therefore remain outside Nature’s own purview, so to 
speak. In a sense, Nature achieves its end by accident through the individual. But this 
begs the question of whether the accidental nature of Nature’s completion is necessary or 
contingent. I would argue that it is a necessary contingency, as it is dependent on the 
activity of the individual seeking itself (autonomy, self-assertion) at its own expense. 
There must be an individual [organism, being] that continually fails to grasp itself; this 
individual is a vehicle of the underlying telos of the whole of Nature. In an interesting 
way, the appearance of the individual as such signifies the invisible activity of Nature; 
after all, the individual is Nature’s activity, albeit transmuted62. So, the activity of the 
                                                
61 Ibid., 67, 69. 
62 Ibid., 34. 
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individual is not essentially different from the activity of Nature; the only major 
difference is that the individual is a finite expression of what would otherwise be the 
infinite activity of Nature. Thus, perhaps the individual product could be interpreted as an 
expression of Nature’s invisibility, as well as the fact that it is unconscious productivity63. 
The argument for the above point would be that despite the fact that the individual 
severs itself from Nature and takes on an activity of its own it remains a particular 
expression of Nature. The individual exercises a degree of freedom in its expression of 
the essence of Nature; by manifesting, the individual becomes a kind of imprint, symbol 
or sign of Nature’s deepest form and essence—the individual is the freedom of Nature 
manifested in a particular way. But as such the individual is forever grounded in and 
dependent on Nature itself; the individual is not really something unto itself, but a varied 
and unique projection of Nature’s vast reservoir of potency. In this respect, the individual 
is a sign of its primordial ground—the World Soul. Organically speaking, once the 
individual is born, it is already on its way to death. This is why Schelling writes that “life 
itself is only the bridge to death64.” Organic life must remain in solicitation of Nature (of 
the forces of Nature), if it is to subsist; even then, its subsistence is temporary. The 
identity between life and death is a fine line: insusceptibility to the influence of Nature, a 
drive to exist independently of external Nature, compels life to assert itself against it; in 
                                                
63 It must be noted that Schelling does not speak of natura naturata as expressions of an unconscious; 
however, anticipating Schelling’s introduction of the concept of the unconscious in the System of 
Transcendental Idealism later in the same year (written in late 1799, published in 1800), the interpretation 
offered here may not be far off. The concept seems even more applicable when we consider that Nature’s 
manifestation, from naturans to naturata, could rightly be understood as a process of the invisible 
becoming visible, invisible Nature—Spirit—becoming visible Nature. Thus, we might say that Schelling’s 
early philosophy, at least as it is expressed in the First Outline, is concerned with articulating a law of 
identity: the invisible is the visible. 
64 Schelling, First Outline, 69. 
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effect, to resist death. As the failed effort at concretization, the individual is abandoned by 
Nature (natura naturans) and so sexuates and dies65. This point will be discussed later in 
this chapter. 
Although organic life is a transmutation of the pure activity of Nature, its identity 
is not absolutely the same66. Whereas the latter is defined by unlimited form 
(formlessness) and uninhibited activity, the former is necessarily limited in form and 
inhibited in activity. Limitation and inhibition require that the organism remain open and 
connected to Nature’s seemingly inexhaustible reservoir of potency. Such openness 
leaves life susceptible to Nature’s sheer indifference to form, order and organization. This 
dual concern to be both open (receptive, expansive) and closed (resistant, contractive) to 
Nature is reflected in life’s own unique activity, which Schelling defines in the following 
way: “The essence of every organism consists in the fact that it is not absolute activity but 
an activity mediated by receptivity; for the existence of the organism is not a being, but a 
perpetual being-reproduced67.” This state of perpetual reproduction is possible only 
because the individual is determined by the inner principle of excitability—the synthesis 
of receptivity and activity. The organism is constituted by an inherent capacity to process 
and respond to external stimuli68. The interaction between organism and external 
influences is continuous and defined by the reciprocal exertion of pressure and force, i.e. 
polarity, or the contraction and expansion of natural forces. Receptivity defines the 
                                                
65 Ibid., 68. 
66 Grant, Philosophies of Nature, 175. 
67 Schelling, First Outline, 160. 
68 “[…] living matter has a basic capacity to perceive environmental impressions and to respond to them. In 
other words, the response of organisms to the environment is mediated by an intrinsic activity of the 
organism.” Nelly Tsouyopoulos, “The Influence of John Brown’s Ideas in Germany,” Medical History 8 
(1988): 71. 
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contractive force whereby the organism is impressed upon and processes external 
influence. 
The synthesis of receptivity and activity is “excitability,” a term Schelling 
borrows from the German physician Andreas Röschlaub (1768-1835)69. Röschlaub 
developed a speculative theory of medicine, Erregbarkeitstheorie (excitability theory), in 
part based on the “Brunonian System of Medicine” of the 18th century Scottish physician 
John Brown (1735-1788)70. Excitability theory posits that a union of contrary natural 
forces is necessary to produce and thereafter to reproduce the organism71. In essence, it 
presents an ontogenetic theory of organic life grounded in the interplay of Nature’s 
constitutive potencies. The concept of excitability is, therefore, an organism’s inner 
architectonic principle which structures and regulates the organism’s constitution as such. 
The principle signifies the organism’s capacity to regulate the flow of Nature’s forces and 
thereby coordinate its organic development. Potencies are processed according to the 
organism’s autarchic drive to reproduce itself from the influx of natural potencies72. In 
constructing itself, the organism becomes like a lightning rod within the system of 
Nature. 
The nature of the product appears fixed and permanent, but it is actually highly 
dynamic and ever-changing. The dialectic of permanence and change is a defining quality 
of organic phenomena. Dalia Nassar writes that the “capacity for self-development and 
reproduction, the drive toward infinite development, is, according to Schelling, nothing 
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other than metamorphosis73.” Moreover, for Schelling, metamorphosis is an “interior 
relation of the forms that is unthinkable without an archetype, which underlies 
everything74.” As such, metamorphosis is “an inner construction” of Nature; Nature, from 
bottom to top, is conditioned by a set of archetypes that precede and constitute the parts 
within a set of formal organic limits75. These limits, however, are not absolute but merely 
relative; furthermore, change and deviation from these limits is not impossible but is an 
inevitable consequence of manifestation and materiality. Nature, consistent with its 
autopoietic, autarchic and autonomous character, provides itself simultaneously with its 
own archetype, which “passes immediately into the product and cannot be separated from 
it76.” Schelling affirms a similar architectonic principle of Spirit when, in 1803, he affirms 
G.W. Leibniz’s (1646-1716) notion that “all changes, all alterations of perceptions and 
representations within a spirit could proceed only from an inner principle77.” The idea is 
that change and alteration are balanced by an organism’s ontogenetic tendency toward 
cohesion and unity. Change and difference are only possible so long as there is also unity 
and identity. This is especially evident in the human being, in whom the concept of 
subject or self signifies a relative unity, if not a permanent one. 
The whole process of organic construction is driven by the law of polarity—
Nature’s potencies turning outward and inward, oscillating between expansion and 
contraction, externalization and internalization. In his short piece, Polarity, Goethe 
describes how Nature generates worldly phenomena by first dividing into a set of jostling 
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75 Ibid., 317. 
76 Ibid., 318. 
77 Schelling, “Introduction to Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature,” 174. 
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independent forces. This division signifies the diremption of original unconditioned 
Nature. These conditioned forces of Nature can either return into themselves, thereby 
closing off any possibility of difference and interaction, or, they can be intensified 
through their opposite force which produces, what Goethe calls, “something new, 
higher78.” In Nature, organic life and phenomena become something higher than the mere 
forces which produce them, as life and phenomena are the products of intensified 
syntheses of the forces themselves79. Dynamic and teleological conceptions of Nature 
were part of the scientific discourse of the late 18th Century, as exemplified by both Kant 
and Goethe. However, it is worth considering that Schelling’s profound concern for 
Nature may not derive solely from reading either of these thinkers. Rather, Schelling’s 
concern for Nature may have grown from earlier influences acquired by his birth and 
baptism in the late 18th Century Pietism of Württemberg. As S. J. McGrath points out, 
Schelling was exposed to the speculative Pietism of Friedrich Christoph Oetinger (1702-
1782) during his childhood and youth80. Evidence for this is that for a time Schelling 
lived with an uncle in Nürtingen while attending Latin school; this uncle was described as 
a “fiery disciple of Oetinger’s81.” Furthermore, still in Nürtingen, Schelling encountered 
Phillip Matheus Hahn (1739-1790), another disciple of Oetinger. McGrath notes that 
Hahn left so great an impression on Schelling that as a boy Schelling “was inspired to 
compose his first poem on the occasion of the great theologian’s death82.” These 
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biographical connections provide clear evidence that Schelling was exposed to Oetinger’s 
theology. 
Oetinger theorized that Nature is the manifestation of the divine. To this end, he 
rejects “mechanism” on the basis that it produces an atomistic view of life and world, 
which, in turn, reduces the Absolute to the “interaction of discrete particles83.” In place of 
mechanism, Oetinger conceived of the Absolute as “self-revealing life84.” The revelation 
of the divine in Nature is made possible by the interplay of various polarities in Nature. 
As we have seen thus far, this notion of Nature is compatible with Schelling’s idea that 
Nature’s true and most basic purpose is self-manifestation. Nature’s manifestation in 
naturata is driven by inner a priori ends (telos) which are achieved with variation a 
posteriori. The law of polarity identifies the catalyst of this underlying process of 
individuation. Individuation is defined by contradiction and conflict; without opposition, 
the formation and sustenance of phenomena is not possible. Yet Schelling’s notion of 
opposition in Nature is grounded in the idea of a “common origin”; Schelling writes in 
On the World Soul (1798), “real antithesis is possible only between things of one kind and 
common origin85.” Despite the fact of multiple forces, there is only one original source of 
all things finite. 
Following Kant’s terminology in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural 
Science (1786), Schelling qualifies polarity as the law of reciprocal determination86. In 
his On the World Soul (1798), Schelling states, “The law of polarity is the general law of 
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the world87.” One of Naturephilosophy’s essential theses is that Nature is constituted by 
the interplay of opposing forces, which, according to the proper mixture of potencies, 
produces organic life. Polarity is therefore a necessary condition of organic production; it 
signifies the continuous negotiation of forces: polarity is the engine of all vital 
phenomena. Polarity explains how the infinite activity of Nature can produce 
something—a product—once it is inhibited; only then will Nature divide into contrarily 
charged forces, conditioning the possibility of phenomenality. The degree of limitation 
necessary to produce an organic product is possible because of the two primary potencies 
or “tendencies” in Nature. These tendencies recall the notion of a centre-point relative to 
which one tendency is centripetal, contracting inward toward the centre, while the other is 
centrifugal, expanding outward to infinity88. The interaction of these tendencies 
constitutes the condition of polarity. The purpose (telos) of polarity and of phenomenality 
is to manifest a visible dimension of the Absolute89. This idea is based on the originary 
division of the Absolute into the dual-aspects of Nature and Spirit. We are not ruling out 
the possibility that Spirit could exist without becoming visible; however, if Spirit is to 
manifest, Schelling’s system seems to suggest that it can only do so through Nature and 
phenomena. In the most basic terms then, Nature’s teleological goal (telos) is to self-
manifest, understanding that the ground of Nature and Spirit are the same. Through 
manifestation, Spirit acquires form, shape and somatic, material being; thus, we may 
conclude that the condition of the possibility of Spirit’s visibility is polarity. 
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2.3 The Third Condition: The “Actant” or “Potency” 
After the unconditionedness of Nature—the postulate and first condition of 
Naturephilosophy— and the law of polarity—the second condition—the third condition is 
the concept of actant (Aktion)90. The individual actant is a divided portion of Nature 
which remains purely productive; its interaction with other actants composes organic 
products. Basically an actant is a primordial power that develops form and definition 
through combination and mixture with other actants. Again, the purely productive 
character of Nature must be posited in order to understand how the product is at all 
possible; without it, there is simply no basis from which to theorize how anything in 
Nature is generated. In this respect, the actant is a material condition of phenomenality 
and organic life. Without it, there is no possibility of producthood. Nothing in Nature is 
simple; each product exists only through the combination of actants (Aktion)91. In this 
sense, the actant is the first division and pluralisation of Nature’s primordial activity 
(natura naturans); although not entirely unlike atoms, they are not substances but powers. 
The actant (Aktion) is synonymous with what Schelling elsewhere identifies as potency 
(Potenz). Although Schelling does not explicitly equate actant with potency, he uses them 
interchangeably. Schelling uses both terms in his description of organic production 
(organic individuation): 
Since each actant is highly individual, and since each strives to produce what it 
must produce according to its nature, this will furnish the drama of a struggle in 
which no force entirely conquers the other nor completely submits to the other. 
The egotism of each individual actant must join itself to that of all the others; 
what is produced is a product of the subordination of all under one and one under 
all, i.e. the most complete mutual subordination. No individual potency could 
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produce the whole for itself, but all together can produce it. The product does not 
lie in the individual, but in all together, for it is indeed itself nothing other than 
the external phenomenon or the visible expression of that constantly operating 
combination and decomposition of elements92. 
 
While first identifying the forces of Nature that produce life as “actants” (Aktion), late in 
the same paragraph Schelling calls them “potencies” (Potenz). In this same passage, 
reminiscent of Goethe’s conception of Nature discussed earlier in this chapter, Schelling 
outlines how the organic product is composed of multiple potencies. All of organic 
nature, each species and individual, is the result of complex sets of relations and linkages 
between potencies. Although Nature is understood as a universal organism in itself93, the 
World Soul, it also contains grades and stages of organic particularization and distinction, 
each of which is only a part of the totality of Nature94. A distinct and individual product 
emerges when “the most complete mutual subordination” occurs. Subordination, in this 
context, means that individual potency is dependent on other potencies to generate the 
organic product; in essence, organic nature is dependent on universal Nature. Potency 
needs others not only to produce life but in order for the potency itself to be transformed 
into something higher and more intense than it is in itself. The independence or egotism of 
potency, as Schelling calls it, must be overcome and opened up to the otherness of 
separately existing potencies. Without the turn toward others, a turn away from egotism 
and self-centredness, life would not emerge in Nature. Centres of interacting potencies 
would not arise and the requisite intensity needed to produce life would remain only 
within the realm of possibility, dissipating each time potency reverts inward. By turning 
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to otherness, the first potency negates its self-affirming inclination in favour of 
intensification through the other potency; it gives itself over to cooperation and 
reciprocity. Thus, the organic product is produced and maintained in a constant 
interaction of potencies, conditioned by the law of polarity, i.e. the reciprocal 
determination of potencies. To draw a contemporary correlation with Schelling’s doctrine 
of potencies, gene theory parallels to some degree the potency-centred idea of Nature. 
Like Nature’s potencies, genes are the simplest and most basic unit of living organisms 
according to contemporary biology and genetics95. Even so, evidence is mounting that 
genes are neither constant nor immutable and that their nature may be defined as much by 
change and dynamism as they are by constancy and fixity96. 
Schelling articulates four principles on the nature of actants. First, “each organism 
is itself nothing other than the collective expression for a multiplicity of actants, which 
mutually limit themselves to a determinate sphere97.” As already noted, an organism is 
composed of a number of potencies interacting with one another. This interactivity is the 
very condition of the possibility of organic matter, and of the dynamism of organic life. 
The activity of the actants explains the mutability and transitoriness of organic states and 
of organic life in general. However, it also identifies that the product has a “lawful 
aspect,” which compels it to produce and to reproduce constantly a degree of order and 
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form through the conjoining of independent potencies. Despite the obvious chaos and 
disjointedness caused by the interplay of potencies, Schelling affirms what he calls “the 
lawful aspect of the product itself98.” This is yet another sign of an inner principle, such 
as “excitability,” which compels the product, if only unconsciously, to regulate and 
reproduce its constitution qua product. This notion suggests a degree of ontogenetic self-
legislation, or autonomy, meaning the product maintains itself beyond being autonomic: it 
is also self-producing (autopoietic) and self-organizing (autarchic)99. 
Schelling’s second principle affirms the latter point quite explicitly. It states that 
the conflicts between actants “must be seen as functions of the organism itself100.” The 
organism cannot be reduced to any single potency or combination of potencies; rather, all 
of the potencies taken together, despite their actions for and against one another, signify 
the underlying identity of the organism101. We must, as Schelling states, interpret the 
struggles of potencies as having been produced by the organism itself. The organism is 
not merely a by-product of potency-interplay; it is not merely an epiphenomenon102. The 
organism is genuinely real and actual, albeit impermanent and subject to change. Andrew 
Bowie affirms this position as well; of the organic product he writes: “When an organism 
develops by the interaction of its constituents it becomes more than the sum of its law-
bound material parts103.” This position is affirmed by Schelling when he writes, in On the 
World Soul (1798), that finite potencies are not phenomena themselves, rather they 
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“conceal themselves behind” phenomena104. If phenomena conceal the potencies which 
constitute them, then the phenomena themselves signify something distinct from the 
potencies, albeit something utterly dependent on the potencies for sustenance. 
Differences between organisms are accounted for by a third principle which states 
that “[A]ll diversity in the organic realm of Nature could proceed from a variation in 
proportion of these functions in respect of their intensity105.” Every species and individual 
embodies a different degree of potency and intensity of receptivity-activity106. 
Organically, two human beings generally have the same kind and proportion of potency; 
this is what conditions human beingness. Individually, however, each one is an 
instantiation of difference, a confluence of potencies incorporated into a particular form 
and shape. Flesh, bone, cartilage, sensitivity, as well as thunderstorms, earthquakes and 
volcanic eruptions are all produced by the interaction of organic potencies. Every instance 
of organic life is an example of potency-exchange and negotiation. This high degree of 
change could suggest an unstable and precarious economy that never achieves permanent 
balance, absolute rest and peace; however, Schelling’s fourth and final principle of the 
actant imagines an inherent tendency toward equilibrium. This implies an inner-drive for 
what may be called “regulation,” i.e. a state in which the potencies attempt to keep one 
another in cooperation and equilibrium107. Surely every moment of life is open to 
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potency-negotiation, but a bonding and unifying tendency appears to be at work in the 
pool of swirling potencies from which all phenomena originate. The whole process of 
potency interaction is driven by the inviolable law of polarity—the law of reciprocal 
determination108. 
 
2.4 The Equilibrium of Organic Life and the Natural Origin of Consciousness 
As noted above, the goal (telos) of Nature’s manifestation in organic products is to reveal 
Spirit. According to Schelling, however, the heterogeneous character of the organic 
renders the goal (telos) of realizing an exact proportion of the Absolute impossible. The 
Absolute as such is by definition the originally indifferent, i.e. the original One. Universal 
Nature—the unconditional (Unbedingte)—thus stands in direct opposition to life, for the 
latter is composite and divisible, tending toward homogeneity but simultaneously 
resisting it. Cooperation between potencies and resistance to the overarching force of 
indifferent Nature are two main characteristics of organic life. The purpose of organic 
production is to see the individual product develop, take shape and become part of 
organic nature. Despite its individuality, each life incorporates and reflects the full 
spectrum and array of organic forces109. There is a common bond between organic 
products, as each one is an admixture of Nature’s potencies. Even as the individual 
product is an embodiment of a universal principle, it protects its particularity against the 
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possibility of absolute dissolution110. A key passage that expresses this tension is: “Nature 
contests the Individual: it longs for the Absolute and continually endeavors to represent it. 
It seeks the most universal proportion in which all actants, without prejudice to their 
individuality, can be unified. Individual products, therefore, in which Nature’s activity is 
at a standstill, can only be seen as misbegotten attempts to achieve such a proportion111.” 
This passage appears in the context where Schelling articulates how Nature is able to 
inhibit its own activity while at the same time remain essentially active. Nature maintains 
both states through what Schelling calls the “sexual drive112,” an a priori regulative 
principle which is meant to account for the possibility and fact of sexual difference 
throughout Nature. Schelling explores sexuation as the condition for the possibility of 
further individuation: without first separating into different sexes, the product cannot 
initiate further development. But sexuation, i.e. limitation according to sex, also 
compromises the possibility of substantial and formal development. 
The separation of the sexes is another layer of division, a kind of recapitulation of 
the original diremption that originated naturata from naturans. The sexed individual thus 
becomes a medium for a higher expression of the Absolute to be manifested in the genus; 
and although the genus too cannot rightfully be identified as a complete manifestation of 
the Absolute, its general, more universal, and in some sense abstract, form makes it 
closer to Nature’s end (telos) than was the individual. Schelling thinks along these lines 
when he writes, “The genus must appear as end of Nature, the individual as means—the 
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individual expire and the genus remain—if it is true that individual products in Nature 
ought to be seen as unsuccessful attempts to represent the Absolute113.” This point 
suggests that Nature may be attributed with a certain degree of intentionality in its 
manifestations. Despite the fact of individuation—the production of a separate 
intentionality—Nature still determines that the individual is not its proper end (telos), as 
the foregoing passage makes clear. This is because the individual is a failed attempt to 
construct an absolute unity of actants. The individual actually represents a limit on 
Nature’s activity and thus is abandoned by Nature and treated as only a means to an 
end—the genus114. Through individuals Nature produces genus, a proportion closer to 
“the most universal proportion115.” In this respect, the sexuation of animal and plant 
naturata is an intentional production by Nature to remain on course toward “the most 
universal proportion.” Sexuation is, therefore, Nature’s strategy to both produce a relative 
manifestation of itself (the individual: a kind of image or self-limit of Nature) while at the 
same time remain infinitely active through the genus. 
Yet, according to Schelling, the activity of the potencies, which produces 
difference and heterogeneity through inhibition and mutual subordination, nonetheless 
strives to express original identity; this is “the basis for all activity in Nature116.” The 
counteraction toward original identity works against the organic product because it is a 
drive originating from universal Nature, which “labors to destroy” the individual117. 
Paradoxically the counterweight from universal Nature is not absolutely contrary to 
                                                
113 Ibid., 41. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid., 35. 
116 Ibid., 40. 
117 Ibid., 41. 
44 
 
life118. In fact, the negative drive of the potencies toward absolute identity sustains life. 
Once life emerges, it cannot sustain itself unless it continues to draw from the wellspring 
of Nature. This process must always be counterbalanced by a positive force; polarity does 
not emphasize the negative force over the positive, but requires both charges to regulate 
phenomena. Universal Nature supplies the potencies that condition productivity; 
simultaneously it seeks to draw the same potencies back into their original state of 
indifference. By compelling the potencies toward indifference, Nature disrupts organic 
productivity; it seeks to annihilate individuality. In this respect, Nature is contrary and 
against life. Conversely, disruption reinforces the need for direct and continuous 
connection between life (particular) and Nature (universal); any interruption sends a 
shockwave through life. If it is to survive and flourish, the organism must balance its 
dependence on Nature. The source of life is also the source of its destruction; life must 
therefore remain in continual solicitation of Nature’s powers. The counteraction between 
life and Nature, if it is in balance, produces a healthy and well-ordered organic product. 
Such equilibrium is, in the context of Naturephilosophy, the highest state of organic 
realization; Schelling calls it the noon of life: “In the degree that activity rises, receptivity 
must fall, until both enter into the most complete reciprocal determination, where they 
maintain equilibrium with one another—which is then the noon of life, as it were119.” Just 
as we must emphasize the necessity of both positively and negatively charged forces, 
conversely we cannot emphasize equilibrium at the expense of disequilibrium. Life is 
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truly the product of disequilibrium brought about by the conflict between the original 
freedom of natura naturans and the relative freedom of natura naturata.  
Schelling offers a notion of Nature’s freedom that serves two purposes. From the 
vantage point of finite Nature, free activity sets out to affirm individual producthood 
above all else. At the same time, infinite Nature seeks to undo individuality. The picture 
that emerges is one in which organisms cannot assert themselves over and above the rest 
of the natural world without producing a startling causality of potential catastrophe and 
self-destruction. Nature abhors an egoist; and yet Nature also needs the energy of an 
egoist in order to self-manifest. Without the vehicles of particularity and ego, i.e. of the 
organism, there is no possibility of Nature’s manifestation. Nature’s ordering keeps each 
thing in check and determined according to her inner necessity, not according to the new, 
albeit derived, freedom of the individual. Organisms are grounded in the way Nature 
moves—the way she animates her products. In this respect, organisms are very much 
subject to the way of manifestation. We might say that in manifestation Nature turns on 
itself. This freedom is the basis of disequilibrium, and it allows manifest products (natura 
naturata) to come into opposition with their origin and ground (natura naturans). In this 
sense, Nature’s freedom is not merely the possibility of self-determination but the 
possibility of negating, and turning away from (deviation), the very source of organic life, 
the very source of being. This sense of freedom, which implies that equilibrium is 
grounded in disequilibrium, is quite radical in its orientation, allowing for the possibility 
that matter, materiality and life itself are the source of both their own ongoing activity 
(self-organization) and their inevitable, even imminent, end. The principle that 
disequilibrium is the ground of equilibrium also describes the original diremption of the 
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Absolute into dual-aspects of Nature and Spirit, as well as Nature’s transition from 
infinite activity to finite potency and phenomena. The original diremption of the Absolute 
could thus be defined as the original disequilibrium necessary for the possibility of world. 
The acme of life is not a point of rest where the product and Nature reach a state 
of eternal reciprocity. The conflict between life and Nature repeats and both remain 
susceptible to the other’s influence. Although Nature will ultimately reabsorb its 
individual products, it is nonetheless affected by the whims and freedom of life. 
Throughout its solicitation of Nature, life oscillates between activity and receptivity. This 
“internal” oscillation represents the process through which the organic product channels 
and directs the solicited powers from Nature. 
 
Life thus has two highest points between which it pulses, as it were, and from the 
one it passes over immediately into the other. The maximum of activity = the 
minimum of receptivity, but the minimum of receptivity = also the minimum of 
activity, that is, the maximum of receptivity, and so it is conceivable how each 
maximum in organic nature passes immediately into its opposite, the minimum, 
and the converse120. 
 
This dialectical movement between degrees of receptivity and activity describes the 
underlying activity of organic potencies. It drives home the extent to which polarity 
conditions every instance of organic life. The polarized nature of the entire schema of 
potency-interaction leaves the product susceptible to disintegration if the potencies are 
inclined to move farther away from one another. Schelling identifies this tendency to 
separation and self-affirmation as a potential danger to the product; the organic state is 
threatened by the consequences of disequilibrium121. This leaves the product vulnerable to 
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disease, collapse and, ultimately, dissolution. On the brink of breakdown, the constitution 
of the product either establishes relative balance and union or dissolves the disturbance 
absolutely. In the latter case, the bond of potencies ceases to cohere and all movement 
and striving is exhausted; whereupon the potencies revert to a point of absolute 
indifference. 
The bond between potencies is determined by and is the outcome of the law of 
reciprocal determination: 
[…] this is precisely the law of all activity, namely: that an activity which no 
longer has an object never reverts into itself, and likewise, that there is no longer 
an object for an activity that has ceased to revert into itself; that in this way the 
highest moment of activity borders immediately on the dissolution of it. Organic 
life begins in this way, with the reflection of an activity through an object, just as 
the higher activity, and the object itself, falls within the point of reflection for the 
organic as for the higher activity. If this point lies infinitely far away then the 
activity is no longer reflected, it has no more intensity and dissipates into the 
infinite. If it lies infinitely near then it has no more extension and disappears into 
itself122. 
 
The bond of potencies is a process and interaction which Schelling likens to chemical 
combustion123. This analogy is intended to convey life’s intensification of the potencies. 
Life itself, then, is a form of combustion. The heat of this process remains constant so 
long as the supply of fuel is proportional to the consumption; the process is economic in 
nature, an ontogenetic version of commodity supply and demand. Together the potencies 
ignite one another and produce something different, higher and more intense than the 
potencies in isolation. As long as the potencies interact, life will exist intact in varying 
degrees of composition and equilibrium, depending on the proportions of potencies 
                                                                                                                                            
more the equilibrium is disturbed within the determinate sphere of Nature that they describe. If they arrive 
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relative to one another. This process of reciprocal determination passes from maximum 
to minimum of force; in-between it produces activity and degrees of intensity equal to the 
product. This is the process through which life is generated and sustained. The point to 
which the potencies withdraw into themselves and, conversely, from which they expand 
into infinity suggests, once more, a centre-point (centrum). Deviation from this centre-
point causes degrees of disequilibrium between potencies124. As long as the proportion of 
potencies is in relative balance or equilibrium, a proper differentiation continues. Thus the 
individual, organic product differentiates itself from universal Nature. In this way, life is a 
state of becoming-inhibited. It is a nexus, always perilously on the cusp of dissolution: the 
abyssal return to original indifference. 
Yet, Schelling asserts that the organic product can never reach a point of absolute 
indifference so long as it exists. Absolute indifference would suggest that the forces that 
produced the product have ceased their activity; at which point the organic product would 
cease to be organic and would return to an inorganic state: “Death is the return into 
universal indifference125.” At death, the forces and potencies of Nature dissipate and 
dissolve the product into universal activity, which produces nothing because the centre or 
nodal point no longer exists to inhibit and solicit universal activity. Activity overpowers 
the actor; the universal reclaims the particular. Schelling summarizes this stage of 
development when he writes: 
Only at the moment when it has ceased to be organic does the product resolve 
itself into the universal indifference. The constituents that were drawn from the 
universal organism revert into it once again; and since life is nothing other than 
an intensified condition of common natural forces, as soon as this condition has 
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passed, the product falls back into the dominion of these forces. The same forces 
which have for a time maintained life finally destroy it too, and so life is not 
anything in itself, it is only the phenomenon of a transition of certain forces from 
that intensified condition into the usual condition of the universal126. 
 
To illustrate his theory of potencies, Schelling likens his conception of the organic 
product to a whirlpool127. The analogy defines Schelling’s conception of equilibrium and 
disequilibrium of universal Nature’s productivity vis-à-vis the seemingly-permanent-but-
merely-apparent128 organic product129. The pool is generated through the interaction of 
opposing forces, which produce the centre-point. While the whirlpool serves as an 
illustration of Schelling’s differentiation between Nature’s productivity and the organic 
product, the magnet is his analogy for the fundamental polarization of forces present 
throughout the universe130. Polarization is the second condition from which germinates 
the whole Naturephilosophy. It assumes that all of Nature can be comprehended 
according to a schema consisting of at least two forces or potencies. As explored above, 
independently the forces have no lasting effect. Schelling’s philosophy is not a form of 
vitalism; there is no singular vital force131. Only polarization causes determinate 
movement by and between the forces. In need of a beginning point for Nature’s 
development, Schelling posits an original division (diremption) as the basis for things, 
which stems from the postulate of Naturephilosophy—the unconditionedness of Nature. 
Schelling states, “there is one cause that brought the original antithesis into Nature and 
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we can designate this cause the (unknown) cause of original magnetism132.” Original 
magnetism implies a state in which two forces are sufficiently charged with the potential 
to be pulled into proximity and relation with one another. The magnetic relationship is 
one in which two move (closer) together as if they were in fact one (a single movement). 
Yet, the magnetic relation does not fuse or sublate the two forces. A fusion of the two 
forces would depolarize (de-intensify) the relation which would lead to inertia or, 
conversely, the overabundance of action and accumulation of power causing dissolution 
and ultimately death. 
At first glance, the magnet recalls Fichte’s early concept of the Transcendental 
Subject133. Just as the magnet includes a negative and a positive force, Fichte’s subject is 
defined by dual positing of negation (not-I) and affirmation (I). Together, the not-I and 
the I compose the Transcendental Subject, the higher unity of the two more basic forces, 
which are caught in a state of striving for and against one another. Schelling affirms a 
similar identity; like Fichte’s concept of self, Schelling argues that identity is realized 
through differentiation and synthesis, albeit a synthesis which is unconscious and never 
complete134. The key difference is that for Schelling the process is objective and 
subjective rather than merely subjective, as it is for Fichte. Naturephilosophy represents 
the objective portion of Schelling’s “system of philosophy.” The objective activity of 
Nature’s forces jostle about, forming a grand array of phenomena; all the while, they have 
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no knowledge of their own activity. Nature only comes to know itself when the forces 
produce a product adequately composed for such a purpose (telos). This purpose acquires 
material form in the unique product of human being; only then has Nature generated eyes 
and ears attuned to the spiritual nature of the phenomenal world. In human being Nature 
acquires a voice sufficient to the task of articulating its inner necessity, the teleology of 
the Absolute’s journey into the open, and the secrets of Nature’s unconscious 
productivity. 
Somewhat paradoxically, articulating the inner necessity of Nature requires 
freedom, a force powerful enough to act against Nature’s autonomy. Thus the autonomy 
of Nature contains the possibility of a second autonomy, i.e. human freedom, capable of 
acting against Nature’s laws. Human freedom reaches out into the external world from an 
inner world of consciousness. In this moment of folding over, of the external world 
reaching beyond the surface of the internal world, and the internal world reaching out 
touching the living world of phenomena, self-consciousness emerges as a centre-point, a 
point of origin and of gathering, in the endless horizon of the cosmos. Interestingly, 
Schelling constructs the subjective portion of his philosophy somewhat independently of 
the objective portion. He calls the former “transcendental idealism: and makes the 
“absolute self” or “I” its centre and beginning point. We will trace the emergence of this 
other autonomy and productivity, that of the self and Spirit, in Chapter II. 
  
52 
 
3. Chapter II 
Schelling’s Transcendental Idealism: On the Odyssey of Spirit 
 
 
The self is pure act, a pure doing135. 
– F.W.J. Schelling (1800) 
 
What we speak of as nature is a poem lying pent in a mysterious and wonderful script. 
Yet the riddle could reveal itself, were we to recognize in it the odyssey of the spirit, 
which, marvellously deluded, seeks itself, and in seeking flies from itself; for through the 
world of sense there glimmers, as if through words the meaning, as if through dissolving 
mists the land of fantasy, of which we are in search136. 
– F.W.J. Schelling (1800) 
 
 
As we have seen thus far in the context of Naturephilosophy, Schelling’s philosophy is 
transcendental: it seeks to articulate the conditions necessary to “how a nature outside us 
is possible137.” Whereas in Naturephilosophy the condition of this possibility was Nature 
itself (natura naturans), in the context of the System of Transcendental Idealism (1800) 
the condition of theoretical construction is the self and its inner necessary activity of self-
positing. From the standpoint of transcendental idealism, Schelling identifies the basis of 
philosophy as “a hypothesis, that there is indeed reality in our knowledge, and we shall 
ask what the conditions of this reality may be138.” The task then of transcendental 
philosophy is to articulate the conditions of the possibility of reality; by limiting his 
investigation to the conditions of reality, Schelling seeks to understand what makes 
knowledge [of self and Nature] possible139. 
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 My contention for this chapter is that in his System of Transcendental Idealism 
Schelling attempts a different approach to the question of the exhibition of the infinite in 
the finite by constructing a philosophy beginning from the standpoint of the subjective 
which produces the objective from out of its inner capacity for production. The 
productivity of the self emerges not from Nature but from itself; therefore, it must be 
considered from its own vantage point and as a separate productivity. This second 
productivity is the self and its teleological goal is twofold: 1) to actualize (transform) the 
potentiality of the Absolute by opening a new region of being into which the Absolute 
may expand; and 2) to formulate an ontologico-epistemological account of the relation 
between Nature and Spirit beginning from the standpoint of the subjective. By offering a 
philosophy from this standpoint, transcendental idealism complements 
Naturephilosophy’s starting point from the objective and edifies its ultimate end—the 
manifestation of the Absolute. 
Like in Nature, Schelling regards the self as a concentrated point of potency; in 
this context, however, the potencies are primarily spiritual and only become natural 
through a process of self-manifestation (from the subjective to the objective). Chapter II 
will thus centre on the proposition from the System of Transcendental Idealism 
(henceforth referred to as System) that the self is what is brought forth (that which one 
“brings forth”)140. In other words, the self is the activity of bringing forth, of manifesting. 
As we will explore and discover, there is an identity between the concept of self as 
activity, doing, and eternal becoming and the notion of Nature (natura naturans) 
presented in the First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature (1799), which, as 
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we saw in the previous chapter, argues that Nature must be understood as a productivity 
which sets its own boundaries and limits (self-producing and limiting Nature). 
The task of transcendental idealism then, as Schelling defines it, is 1) to account 
for the “original genesis of consciousness141,” and 2) to answer the question, “how does 
nature come to be presented142?” The former question is ontological, as it seeks 
consciousness’ origin—that which makes it possible; the latter question is 
epistemological, asking how Nature is constructed into “presentations” for the self, i.e. 
how does it come to be known. Because the self is the starting point of Schelling’s 
investigation in the System, the task he gives himself is to account for how Nature (or the 
objective portion of consciousness) comes to be from out of the self. When considered 
together, the self and Nature represent two sides of knowledge (or of knowing), i.e. the 
subject and the object respectively. Together they make possible the consciousness-of 
something: the self and Nature together form the possibility of consciousness. In the 
System, the story of consciousness’ emergence posits a division between the self and 
Nature somewhat analogous to the emergence of organic life as detailed in Chapter I. The 
split signified by consciousness rests on what Schelling calls “the absolutely identical” 
which must have already divided itself in order for it to seek an objective knowing of 
itself143; this is the work of the self and by extension the genesis of the objective world 
“outside us.” 
As we saw in the Naturephilosophy with the organic product, selfhood eventually 
emerges from a process in Nature that begins with what Schelling calls a “tearing loose 
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from universal nature144”; this represents the moment of original division of Nature. What 
differs in transcendental idealism is that the division which makes consciousness possible 
emanates from the self, not from Nature. Schelling asserts that as consciousness emerges 
as intelligence “it must oppose the succession” [of objective presentations] “to itself, in 
order to intuit itself therein145”; thus “Nature” is to be regarded as an object posited from 
out of the self’s inner being and necessity. In effect, Schelling’s philosophy of Spirit 
(transcendental idealism) is a reversal of Kant’s idealism. Whereas Kant insists that 
Nature must be purely objective—separated from the subjective by an epistemological 
gulf—Schelling attempts to think Nature as “subjective synthesis.” Bearing this point in 
mind, the telos of the self’s imposed opposition to itself is the recognition that its nature is 
productivity rather than mere producthood146. In other words, by opposing itself to the 
self-produced “presentations” of world, the self sets the necessary conditions to become 
aware of its synthetic, dynamic nature147.  
Reflection through posited Nature plays a pivotal role in the self’s ongoing 
process of becoming-self-conscious; it ultimately reveals the essential productivity on 
which products rest. Reflection is thus a moment of consciousness, a mode of the self and 
an inhibited form of originary productivity, through which Spirit must journey toward 
transcendental knowing of itself. As we will see, in reflection the self turns toward itself 
to be for itself, but in so doing recognizes that its being exceeds its grasp; its being is in 
excess of its capacity to comprehend and know both itself and that which is not-itself 
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(Nature). In effect, just as we saw in the context of Nature in Chapter I, Schelling again 
attempts to grasp the curious link between dependence (heteronomy, necessity) and 
independence (autonomy, freedom), only this time within Spirit. This is the paradox of 
independence (autonomy) and dependence (heteronomy): the individual must 
simultaneously assert its individual existence, while remaining dependent upon an other, 
in this case Nature, which is never fully reconciled. Thus, reflection is a mode of selfhood 
which pushes the self to overreach and overextend itself. Reflection is the moment when 
the self intuits its potential, as well as its incapacity to fulfill the potential through pure 
(theoretical) reason and discursive knowledge: “[…] the intelligence must appear to itself 
as an organic individual148.” Recognizing its organic nature and its individuality, the 
individual becomes aware of its limitedness; the self “becomes wholly limited149.” As 
Schelling conceives it, the problem then centres on the relation between the inherent 
limitedness of the self and its freedom to transform beyond its self-given limits. This 
chapter will explore this problem in more detail. 
Charting the general outline of the self’s trajectory from infinite productivity to 
objective reality in the forms of art and history, this chapter is divided into four sections 
which follow a similar pattern and structure as Chapter I. Section I looks at the postulate 
and first condition of transcendental idealism, the notion that the self, in its most basic 
and primitive form, must be grasped as infinite activity or “eternal becoming.” In other 
words, the self is not a static and fixed reality but a doing. This notion leads into the 
second section of the chapter which looks at the second condition of transcendental 
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idealism: the dialectical nature of the self. The self is to be grasped as activity, and a 
producing activity at that, i.e. an activity which produces something; furthermore, its 
activity consists of two distinct poles or tendencies variously identified as “the self,” “I”  
or “the ideal and “the not-self,” “not-I” or “the real.” Together these tendencies produce 
dialectic, a spiritual equivalent to natural polarity. The third section of this chapter will 
look at what I refer to as the third condition of transcendental idealism: what Schelling 
refers to as the “twofold series of actions” or the necessary and the free. This distinction 
plays a role in understanding the significance of and difference between theoretical and 
practical philosophy; it also sets the stage for the fourth condition, i.e. the notion that 
selfhood (or self-consciousness) emerges according to three distinct epochs. Together 
these epochs compose what Schelling calls “the odyssey of the spirit150.” 
 
3.1 The Postulate and First Condition: The Self as Activity, Eternal Becoming 
 
The postulate and first condition of Schelling’s transcendental idealism is his concept of 
the self. Just as Nature was conceived as primordial activity and amounted to a form of 
productivity, Schelling defines the self in similar terms. The self is variously described as 
“absolutely free action151,” “unconditioned152,” not “a thing” but “a doing153,” as 
“becoming154” and as “the ground—and inner principle, of all reality155.” The self as 
unconditioned, free and as ground is the soil from which transcendental idealism will 
sprout and bloom. Yet Schelling’s very postulation of a concept of self necessitates that 
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the transcendental perspective from which Schelling’s brand of idealism will be 
constructed is assumed and the construction already underway. This is because the self as 
concept, and as beginning point of idealism156, is a postulate. The self “is itself an 
absolutely free action, and so cannot be demonstrated, but only demanded; so if the self is 
itself this intuition merely, it too, as principle of philosophy, is itself merely something 
that is postulated157.” It is worth noting that Schelling understands the “postulate” as 
something in between the “theorem” (signifying theoretical philosophy) and the 
“command” (signifying practical philosophy)158. Philosophical postulates thus begin from 
a middle ground, so to speak, between the theoretical and the practical; perhaps because 
of this neutrality, the postulate is able to initiate a transcendental investigation and unify 
the former and the latter under a single overarching philosophy—transcendental idealism. 
As postulate the self is what Schelling starts with and from in order to make 
possible a transcendental philosophy from the perspective of the subjective. The self is 
thus the condition for the possibility of the philosophical position to be outlined in the 
System. But as a condition, the self is conceived of as absolutely free and in need of no 
conditions to support itself; in this respect, the self is in fact unconditioned159. On this 
basis, and with the end (telos) of transcendental idealism in mind, Schelling states that 
transcendental philosophy “proceeds from no existent, but from a free act, and such an act 
can only be postulated160.” The nature of the self is not considered already or immediately 
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present to the self but that it must be brought forth by the self161: “What the self is, we 
experience only by bringing it forth, for nowhere but in the self is the identity of being 
and producing fundamental162.” The notion at work is that the self is both producer and 
that which it produces (the produced); moreover, the self must reach a point where this 
distinction is not regarded as an absolute, irreconcilable duality but where the two halves 
are regarded as immediately and absolutely one163. Notwithstanding the identity of 
producer and produced (“self=self164”), the distinction remains intact and, as we will 
begin to see in section two of this chapter, is necessary to the self’s manifestation. 
According to Schelling, the proposition “self=self” converts the typical proposition of 
identity (A=A) into a synthetic proposition. The point is that what appears as a simple 
statement of two identical states of affairs (self as producer and self as produced), or 
logical equivalence, is really an attempt to think through the difference of being (object) 
and thinking (subject) in order to demonstrate the original identity which makes possible 
consciousness165. 
Although Schelling defines the self as “a higher concept than that of a thing, 
namely the concept of doing, or activity166,” the postulation of self as “free activity” does 
not account for the fact of the objective world; nor does it account for the self’s 
knowledge (intuition) of itself as free activity. The concept in itself is insufficient to an 
understanding of the objective and subjective dimensions of the self. Free activity as such 
does not imply or contain the concepts of subject and object (subjective and objective). It 
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is possible that free activity, or alternatively free productivity, will produce such concepts 
provided a form of counter-activity is present and brought to bear over and against the 
self’s original unconditioned, unrestricted freedom. In short, no object will appear, and 
consequently no subject will exist, so long as there is only the free activity of the self. It is 
only by limiting itself that the self comes to intuit itself as “an infinite becoming167.” This 
means that becoming is unthinkable without the self-given limitations of the self; 
becoming can only be thought under a condition of limitation and restraint. Under this 
condition, which is a demand the self places on itself, the self grasps its unbounded-
bounded nature. The boundary of the self’s striving is composed of two aspects borne out 
in a variety of dualities: the subject and the object, the real and the ideal, etc. This is 
because Schelling understands self-consciousness as “one absolute synthesis168”; and in 
order to produce a synthesis there must be at least two basic elements to be brought into 
relation. In effect, the self is the subject-object, or the ideal-real169. The composite nature 
of the self comes about from its “urge to produce the infinite170,” which is only possible 
through the self-demand to be limited and finite: the unlimited will be expressed within 
the limited. The point is not that subject and object merge into a single, overarching 
identity, or that the ideal and real boundaries of the self’s activity fuse to produce a single 
power; rather, a tension between the opposing elements is sustained. In fact, the self is 
nothing else but the sustenance of this tension, or, as Schelling phrases it in one passage, 
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“a mutual interrelation of the two opposing elements therein171.” The emphasis, it seems, 
should be placed on the interrelatedness of the elements, the fact that the self brings them 
to bear on one another. This continuous process is, in effect, both the freedom of the self, 
its urge to manifest infinity, and its necessity, the fact that what it manifests is nothing 
other than its own nature172. 
 
 
3.2 The Second Condition: Spiritual Polarity, the Dialectic of Self and Nature 
 
In this section we will consider a general outline of the self’s activity and explore how 
this activity produces reality. We will also consider how Schelling’s notion of spiritual 
polarity, or dialectic, differentiates Schelling’s concepts of self and subjectivity from 
those of Kant and, especially, Fichte. Schelling is clear that the self must be taken as the 
starting point of transcendental idealism; the self is “the ground—and inner principle, of 
all reality173.” In this respect, his concept of self might seem quite close, if not the same, 
as Fichte’s; however, there are important differences that will be explored later in this 
section. First, we must consider how Schelling describes the self’s constitutive activity 
through its positing of Nature. Nature—the other of the self—is a product of the self’s 
productivity (activity and limitation) and it is through this antithesis that the nature of 
Spirit is to be discovered174. As interpreters, we should note that the self’s productivity, as 
well as the construction of a philosophy that begins from the subjective, poses a problem 
relative to Naturephilosophy; effectively, the two philosophies appear immediately 
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incompatible and irreconcilable, given that they begin from opposing perspectives. This 
presents a paradox at the heart of Schelling’s philosophy circa 1799 and 1800; a paradox 
that we have already flagged but that must be kept in mind at all times. As noted in 
Chapter I, Schelling seems to have his cake and eat it too; he is attempting to construct a 
philosophy that affirms Nature as autonomous and free that is nonetheless dependent on 
the fact of subjective synthesis. The tension between these two goals remains a part of 
Schelling’s dualistic philosophy, i.e. his Naturephilosophy and transcendental idealism. 
Schelling begins to work out the tension only in 1801, as part of his treatise Presentation 
of My System of Philosophy, which will receive some attention in the Conclusion. 
Returning then to Schelling’s transcendental idealism, the second condition of the self is 
that it consists of a conflict of absolutely opposed activities or tendencies175. The first 
tendency “originally reaches out into infinity”; this is “the real, the objective, limitable 
activity176”; the second is an inclination “to intuit oneself in that infinity” and “is called 
the ideal, subjective, illimitable activity177.” These activities recall the repulsive and 
expansive forces of Nature theorized as part of Naturephilosophy. In effect, what occurs 
in Nature also occurs in Spirit. The origin of the former’s activities is from the objective 
standpoint moving toward the subjective, whereas the latter moves in the opposite 
direction. 
 In its original state the self lacks for all qualities and predicates of thinghood 
including existence itself. Schelling describes this state in the following way: 
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Since the self actually possesses none of the predicates that attach to things, we have 
an explanation of the paradox that one cannot say of the self that it exists. For one 
cannot say of the self that it exists, precisely because it is being-itself. The eternal, 
timeless act of self-consciousness which we call self, is that which gives all things 
existence, and so itself needs no other being to support it178. 
 
The self in its original state is self-given and self-sufficient. Yet it is effectively nothing, 
or, at minimum, nothing existent. If the self were to remain nothing but free unlimited 
activity, mere being-itself, then its activity would not amount to much; its productivity 
would in fact produce nothing at all. Schelling thus identifies an urge within the self to 
manifest something from its infinite activity. The self’s urgency is what drives its activity 
to production. Partly on the influence of Fichte’s philosophy, Schelling finds that the self 
must follow an ontologico-epistemological path outside itself, i.e. outside the unity of the 
self’s infinite potency in itself. The self must first divide itself—make a duality of its 
infinity—in order ultimately to produce an awareness of its unity as self-consciousness179. 
The self accomplishes this end by identifying two distinct tendencies within its nature. 
Schelling describes them in the following way: 
The self has an urge to produce the infinite, and this tendency must be thought of as 
directed outwards (as centrifugal), but it is not distinguishable as such without an 
activity regressively directed inwards to the self as center. The outgoing, by nature 
infinite activity is the objective in the self; the self-reverting activity is nothing else 
but the striving to intuit oneself in infinitude. Through this action as such, the inner 
and the outer are divided within the self, and with their separation is posited a 
conflict in the self that only the necessity of self-consciousness can explain180. 
 
Spiritual polarity thus consists of two activities, one which is without limitation (the 
centrifugal) and the second (the centripetal) which reverts back to the self as “centre.” 
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These activities together form a genuine duality at work within the self; they are the 
tendencies and activity of Spirit.  
Spirit is not driven by a single urge—the urge to produce infinity; it is driven by 
contrary urges to be both infinite and finite simultaneously. This is the condition of 
spiritual polarity (dialectic): the self desires to reach out of itself to seek what may be 
contained within infinity but having done so the self also withdraws back into itself in 
order to mediate its infinite activity within self-imposed limits. The contrast is between 
producing something other than itself and producing nothing but itself. In its most basic 
form, spiritual polarity is composed of the dynamic of centrifugal and centripetal 
tendencies. This form serves as the basis for a multitude of dichotomies essential to 
Schelling’s demonstration of transcendental idealism. Among these are the distinctions of 
the objective (object) and the subjective (subject), Nature and self, thing and concept, etc. 
The distinction between object and subject is crucial to Schelling’s epistemology but it is 
not the most basic formulation of spiritual polarity; rather they are forms which are 
generated by dialectic in order that the self may objectify itself and, coincidentally, 
subjectify (make a subject) itself in order for the self to make an object of itself through 
Nature. The object-subject distinction is how the self grasps itself; it represents in 
fundamental terms the identity of self-consciousness. 
The identity in self-consciousness is a mediated, synthetic identity, not an original 
one. The most basic form of the division of self-consciousness is the identity of subject 
and object 181. This division in consciousness separates thing (the real) from concept (the 
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ideal) giving the impression that Schelling offers a “two-world” theory of reality182. 
However, the division is not ontologically absolute, i.e. not a permanent and irreparable 
rift in the self, but rather an epistemologically necessary rift. The self posits the polarity 
of subject and object on the basis of its own activity (of Spirit, the centrifugal and 
centripetal tendencies) in order to make an object of itself183. The separation is an act of 
self-delusion in the sense that the self as subject grasps itself as different from Nature—
self as object184. Yet as misguided as the division seems it is a necessary stage on the way 
to self-consciousness because it allows the self to enter into a mode of reflection in which 
it considers its nature both as subject and as object. This mode will be described in brief 
later in this chapter; suffice it to say that so long as the self recognizes the object as 
having been self-posited, it will have understood that division and reflection are necessary 
to its self-given spiritual telos.  
Schelling describes the state of the self in terms of the object-subject distinction in 
the following way: 
The self contains fundamental opposites, namely subject and object; they cancel one 
another out, and yet neither is possible without the other. The subject asserts itself 
only in opposition to the object, and the object only in opposition to the subject; 
neither, that is, can become real without destroying the other, but the point of 
destruction of one by the other can never be reached, precisely because each is what 
it is only in opposition to the other. Both have therefore to be united, for neither can 
destroy the other, and yet nor can they subsist together. The conflict, therefore, is not 
so much a conflict between the two factors, as between the inability, on the one hand, 
to unite the infinite opposites, and the necessity of doing so, on the other, if the 
identity of self-consciousness is not to be blotted out185. 
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Schelling identifies two essential ends (telos) of the self. The first is the resistance to 
unity and an inclination to preserve each tendency’s distinction from the other; this 
maintains the tension between the self’s “factors” of subject and object. The second end is 
the necessity of uniting the factors and thereby cancelling the tension by producing a 
unity of the two. In essence, the conflict is an attempt to mediate the contrary ends of 
preserving and cancelling the tension at the core of the self. We should note that this 
dialectic sounds somewhat like Hegel’s dialectic of Aufheben or Aufhebung (sublation), a 
German word literally meaning the dual actions of cancelling and preserving something. 
The dialectic of sublation is a distinctive element of Hegel’s Absolute Idealism; it seeks 
to produce a third philosophical perspective synthesized from two more primitive and, 
therefore, less rational perspectives. Despite Schelling’s description of the self’s conflict, 
suggesting actions of cancelling and preserving, Hegel’s dialectic is different from 
Schelling’s. In the above quoted passage, for instance, Schelling does not mention any 
kind of sublation or need for a third category which synthesizes the self’s two opposing 
drives or urges. For Schelling, there is no need for a third; rather, the aporia between the 
two conflicting activities is what makes the interaction productive; to fill that gap, so to 
speak, would decelerate all of the self’s (Spirit) activity. Historically, Schelling’s dialectic 
was influential on Hegel and his development of Absolute Idealism; however, there are 
significant differences between Schelling’s and Hegel’s philosophies and the latter is not 
reducible to the former. We will not dwell on this point further; however, an appendix has 
been added that presents a brief comparison of Schelling’s and Hegel’s respective 
philosophies. 
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Schelling’s notion of spiritual polarity contains interesting implications for the 
nature of consciousness (cognition) and freedom. First, Schelling’s first insight into the 
polarity of Spirit is that consciousness ultimately cannot be regarded as self-sufficient. 
This is because the activity of Spirit is not something that the self immediately grasps but 
comes to see only through its reflection in Nature; the self as subject thus depends on 
something outside itself. To further define this point, Schelling posits “a region of 
consciousness where this separation” between subject and object “does not yet exist, and 
where inner and outer worlds are conceived as interfused186.” This region is the 
“unconscious.” 
Schelling holds a distinctive place in the history of the concept of the unconscious, 
as has been shown in a recent book by S. J. McGrath187. Schelling’s earliest conception of 
the unconscious is found in his System; historically, it also represents the first explicit 
conceptualization of the unconscious. In the System, Schelling presents what could be 
termed a “teleological unconscious.” This idea of the unconscious identifies hidden ends 
(telos) in history and the self which nonetheless drive the whole movement and 
development of organic and spiritual life. Part of Schelling’s project is to articulate the 
reality of Nature as the ground of spiritual being. Although Schelling’s project is a form 
of idealism as he too regards freedom as an activity of the subject in a world otherwise 
restricted by laws of natural necessity, he departs from typical idealism as he makes 
explicit the necessity of an unconscious ground for consciousness (a formulation of the 
identity of necessity and freedom). In comparison, Fichte posited that freedom must 
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ground all of philosophy; free activity of the subject amounts to self-positing188. The self 
posits itself first as self or “I” and then as not-self or “not-I”; similar to the way Schelling 
posits Nature as the opposite, or other, of the self.  
The System is in part Schelling’s attempt to incorporate aspects of Fichte’s 
Subjective Idealism into a more comprehensive philosophy, i.e. one that does not limit 
itself to the subjective. According to Fichte, the subject recognizes that the positing of 
both self and not-self is dependent on a higher superstructure or condition—the 
“Transcendental Subject189.” Knowledge of the Transcendental Subject is not achieved 
deductively or analytically but through an intellectual synthesis of the mutually occurring 
concepts of self and not-self. Self-positing occurs regardless of the thought process of the 
subject; it is active and unconscious. Schelling grasps this implication and exploits it in 
order to clarify Fichte’s conception of the not-self by explicitly identifying it, in the 
System, with both unconsciousness and Nature. The unconscious plays into Schelling’s 
idea that freedom is not without restriction. Freedom requires a counterpart, i.e., necessity 
or limitation. The self’s original drive for freedom—to bring forth—is quelled and 
brought under constraint because it simultaneously posits its own limitation. The self sets 
limits to its production; this is how it becomes an object for itself and how self-
consciousness unfolds. Schelling makes this plainly clear in the following, “[…] in the 
concept of positing we also necessarily think the concept of a counterpositing, and thus in 
the action of self-positing we likewise have a positing of something opposed to the 
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self190.” Through the simultaneous acts of positing and counterpositing, the self delimits 
the bounds of its being; together these dual activities compose “the mechanism of the 
self”—derived from the presupposition of the conflict of activities191.  
Before Schelling, Fichte had defined freedom by eliminating Kant’s concept of 
the thing-in-itself. For Fichte, the thing-in-itself was unnecessary and no aid to an account 
of self and Nature. Instead, Fichte argues that subjectivity has only one activity, the free 
activity of self-positing. The act by which the self posits itself is already unconscious in 
Fichte, although he does not explicitly identify it as such. Moreover, Fichte understands 
the significance of freedom to be ethical, not aesthetic as Schelling understands it (this 
point will be explored further later in this chapter). For Fichte, the self is always striving 
to catch up with itself morally; this infinite activity, which, to some extent, frustrates the 
self, is also what constitutes it as such. In this regard, Fichte’s conception of the self 
cannot be reduced to the Cartesian “I think”; it actually expands the subjectivist concept 
of self. However, it also fails to recognize that the self is grounded in that which is 
genuinely other than self. Insofar as there is a thing-in-itself in Fichte’s system, it is given 
by subjectivity itself; it is not a trace of something beyond the faculties of understanding 
and sensibility. In other words, self, and reason with it, is necessarily self-limiting and 
reason gives itself its own boundaries; moreover, the self is capable of grasping the extent 
of these boundaries completely. Schelling’s position, in contrast, is more sophisticated, 
treating Nature as a positive reality unto itself, albeit one that is dependent on the self’s 
productive capacity. (This is another instance of the paradox at the core of Schelling’s 
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philosophy—the attempt to have both Nature and the self, each one unto themselves, 
making the other possible and yet being utterly dependent on the other.)  
Schelling summarizes the difference between his philosophical approach and 
Fichte’s in his Presentation of My System of Philosophy (1801): “Fichte might have held 
an idealism relative to the standpoint of reflection, whereas I situated myself and the 
principle of idealism at the standpoint of production192.” In Fichte’s account, Nature is 
only a mirror for subjectivity; the subject posits opposition, which Nature thenceforth 
signifies193. For Fichte, Nature is an otherness posited so that subjectivity may overcome 
it by appropriating Nature into subjectivity itself, i.e., by rendering Nature a guise of 
Transcendental Subjectivity, rather than affirming it as genuine otherness and a reality 
unto itself. Schelling noticed that by grounding freedom in the otherness of Nature, Fichte 
was in effect grounding consciousness in unconsciousness; there is, therefore, a necessary 
element of unconsciousness in consciousness and an element of the genuinely not-self in 
the self. Schelling thus affirms the reality of Nature; moreover, he affirms that Nature 
signifies the unconsciousness of selfhood: Schelling calls it “the original, as yet 
unconscious, poetry of the spirit194.”  
The final sections of the System are a first formal attempt to think the meaning of 
an unconscious part of the self. By grounding freedom in unconsciousness, Schelling 
expands Fichte’s concept of freedom to include territory, so to speak, that is not 
immediately, if ever, accessible to reason. Unconsciousness signifies something 
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irrational, or at least something non-rational—that is outside the purview of rationality195. 
In effect, Schelling opens up a new dimension of selfhood; no longer is the self merely a 
rational agent of efficient freedom but the ground of becoming. Whereas Fichte and Kant 
before him place freedom squarely within [subjective] cognition, Schelling places 
freedom outside of cognition, perhaps, in a sense, underneath cognition in the original 
identity of the self, thereby giving it a non-rational and non-subjective basis. 
Michael Vater calls Schelling’s project, circa 1800, “the recourse to a hypothesis 
of a pre-established harmony of freedom and determinism196.” The pre-established 
harmony of freedom and determinism is what Schelling calls the Absolute. It is the 
identity between freedom and necessity, the self and Nature, and the subjective and the 
objective. The introduction of this pre-established harmony redefines the idealist project, 
if we understand idealism as an attempt to affirm the reality of freedom and autonomy in 
a world otherwise determined by natural necessity. Schelling does not conceive of 
freedom as independence from external determination; rather, freedom is wrapped up in 
external determination to the extent that freedom and necessity together equal the 
Absolute. Effectively, being and thinking are constituted by consciousness and 
unconsciousness. On this point, Schelling writes, “Freedom is to be necessity, and 
necessity freedom. But now in contrast to freedom, necessity is nothing else but the 
unconscious. That which exists in me without consciousness is involuntary; that which 
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exists with consciousness is in me through my willing197.” Schelling’s goal is not the 
affirmation of freedom in spite of determinism but the relation between the two—the 
Absolute. He recognizes that there is a portion of selfhood that cannot appear to and for 
consciousness in the direct and explicit way that spontaneous, efficient freedom implies 
because it defies conscious presentation (the category consciousness-of). This portion is 
precisely what Schelling describes as existing “without consciousness” and is therefore 
“involuntary.” Furthermore, Schelling explains that the nature of action can be considered 
from two contrary positions: subjectively, I—conscious self—act; objectively, something 
unconscious acts through me198. Both the subjective and objective ways of considering an 
action resolve in the self, but represent two distinct elements, namely the conscious and 
the unconscious. Schelling posits an identity between the two. By identity, Schelling does 
not mean that the two are reducible to one another; rather, the conscious sense of an 
action, i.e., that it appears “free,” is dependent on the unconscious sense of the action, i.e., 
the action is not free but occurs within a limited state of being. In this way, Schelling 
presents a “teleological unconscious”: the self through Nature is purposive; it is directed 
toward a particular end (telos) regardless of whether the end has been or will be made 
explicit and conscious to the subject. Schelling thus concludes that the self’s productivity 
is largely unconscious; thus, the ends (telos) toward which the self moves are actualized 
according to an unwritten plan, so to speak, that nevertheless follows a particular design. 
Action remains unconsciously determined even as it is consciously and freely 
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undertaken199. This is what Schelling means when he writes that “[T]he self is conscious 
in respect of production, unconscious in regard to the product200.” The subject knows that 
something is generated through its activity; precisely what is generated remains outside 
the purview of human consciousness. The point is concerned with subjectivity’s capacity 
to determine the outcome of unconscious productivity. 
The self and Nature are not mechanisms without a program or design, à la Hume 
or perhaps even Kant circa the Critique of Pure Reason (1781); their distinctive 
productivities are bound up with history—the progressive realization of the single, 
infinite ideal which Schelling calls the Absolute201. Schelling’s account of Spirit’s 
journey to self-knowledge is articulated according to a series of three “epochs,” wherein 
each epoch represents a particular stage of Spirit’s self-knowing, its progress from 
unconsciousness to consciousness on the way to self-consciousness. The division of 
Spirit’s odyssey into three epochs is the fourth significant condition of Schelling’s 
transcendental idealism; it hinges on the notion of the self as historical being, i.e. its 
historicity. But before we consider the nature of these epochs, we must consider the third 
condition, i.e. that which explains the necessity of introducing the concept of “epoch” in 
the first place. This condition is what Schelling calls “the twofold series of actions202.” 
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3.3 The Third Condition: The Twofold Series of Actions, the Necessary and the Free 
The conflict of the self’s opposing activities does not resolve in one single action (unity) 
but is continuous in an “infinite series of actions203.” The third condition of Schelling’s 
transcendental idealism is his notion of a “twofold series of acts,” one original and 
necessary and the other derived, copied, imitated and free. Without this distinction there 
is no possibility of transcendental idealism204. To put it somewhat crudely, the twofold 
series signifies the being of the self (the first series) and self-knowledge (the second 
series). Thomas Pfau argues that the notion of a twofold series of actions is an 
appropriation of the Platonic concept of anamnesis and therefore represents a process 
through which the self unforgets or remembers its nature to itself205. There is good reason 
to accept Pfau’s interpretation as Schelling’s [concept of] self is deeply and necessarily 
engaged in a process through which it comes to a more complete knowledge of itself. The 
odyssey of Spirit may not be entirely Platonic but it is a journey of self-knowledge. 
Schelling writes of the twofold series of acts: 
So long as the self is apprehended in its original evolution of the absolute synthesis, there is 
only one series of acts, that of the original and necessary acts of the self; as soon as I 
interrupt this evolution, and freely project myself back to its starting-point, there arises for 
me a new series, in which what was necessary in the first series is now free. The former is 
the original, the latter the copy or imitation. If the second series contains no more and no 
less than the first, the imitation is perfect, and a true and complete philosophy is 
engendered. In the opposite case, the result is a false and incomplete one206. 
 
The notion of the “twofold series of acts” suggests that at a certain point in its becoming 
the self apprehends its basic activity in two distinct ways. The first series is the original 
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and necessary manifestation of the self and its objective counterpart (Nature). This first 
series may signify the self’s being and unconscious self-manifestation; as such, the first 
series represents the necessary ground—the condition—on which all knowledge of the 
self becomes possible. The second series is a kind of interruption of the first and the 
emergence of a second parallel series of actions. It is a rendering conscious and free of 
the otherwise unconscious and necessary series. The second series does not erase or 
replace the first but parallels it; it coexists alongside the first as if the latter were imitating 
the former and thus duplicating it. The first series of actions thus serves as an unconscious 
principle relative to the second. 
Schelling characterizes the second series by “interruption” and 
“retrospectiveness,” i.e. a capacity to disrupt the “evolution” of the first series by having 
the self turn on the series itself and look back to its ground. It seems that the second 
series, which Schelling describes as a copy or imitation, is an artificially generated series 
from out of the conscious-freedom, or productivity of the self made conscious, as opposed 
to its unconscious-necessity which first initiates its manifestation. The second series 
opens up the self to its own historicity, i.e. the fact of its own historical being; within the 
series the self sees that its being consists of an ongoing conflict of opposing activities, as 
well as the fact that its awareness of this conflict unfolds only gradually and deepens the 
further one investigates. Whereas the first series of acts may be conceived as a kind of 
mathematical space-time, the groundwork for the possibility of consciousness (the second 
series), the latter transforms the mathematical space-time of the self into a dynamic 
historical progression such that the self sees itself as having passed through a series of 
“epochs” (effectively stages) which begin in a state of unconsciousness and pass through 
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primitive consciousness on the way to self-consciousness. Philosophy is thus defined as 
“the free imitation, the free recapitulation of the original series of acts207.” And yet the 
complete enumeration of original actions within the second series is an infinite task and, 
therefore, ultimately impossible. Schelling thus limits his exploration of self-
consciousness to its overarching epochs208.  
In summation, the first series of actions makes possible the second series, which, 
in turn, makes possible the self’s explanation and theorization of the three distinct stages 
of its becoming. The concept of the twofold series of actions is the basis for Schelling’s 
theory of the three epochs of selfhood. The end (telos) of philosophy thus becomes “a 
history of self-consciousness”; and philosophy seeks this end in order to account for how 
the various epochs of selfhood are interrelated and how they combine to produce what 
Schelling calls “one absolute synthesis209.” As we will soon discover, the art product is 
the apex of Schelling’s aesthetic imagination and, therefore, of practical philosophy, but 
history emerges as a primary object of philosophy: the reality of historical consciousness 
and being. This idea or thematic is first formulated in Schelling’s concept of the epochs of 
selfhood. 
 
3.4 The Fourth Condition: The Epochs of Selfhood, the “Odyssey of Spirit” 
 
Coplestone writes that Naturephilosophy is the development of “a systematic ideal 
construction of Nature210.” In this respect, Naturephilosophy is theoretical; it is a 
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deduction of Nature, or construction, from first principles. One implication of Schelling’s 
conception of Nature is that in constructing Nature from first principles Nature is in fact 
constructing itself through what Coplestone calls “the watchful attention of the mind211.” 
This is why Naturephilosophy is transcendental; it seeks the conditions for the possibility 
of Nature. This point also applies to transcendental idealism; the difference is that the 
latter is a systematic real construction of Spirit; the goal of which is an account of the 
possibility of self-consciousness. In this second to last section of Chapter II, we will 
consider in brief how Schelling outlines the practical genesis of consciousness (the self) 
and its history, which, according to Schelling, manifest through a series of three specific 
“epochs.” These epochs represent phases of the continuous history of self-
consciousness212. The first epoch moves from original or primitive sensation to 
productive intuition. It is composed of the construction of the material from out of Spirit; 
this production is unconscious because Spirit has yet to become conscious213. At this 
stage, Spirit unconsciously constructs its other—Nature—as a first step in its journey 
toward self-consciousness and self-knowledge. This epoch thus defines the nature of 
primitive matter from the vantage point of Spirit. From this perspective, matter is inferior 
to mind; Schelling’s position falls within a line of idealist thinkers that held a similar 
viewpoint. Schelling acknowledges this inheritance; he cites Leibniz who regarded matter 
as “the sleeping state of monads” and the 18th century Dutch philosopher François 
Hemsterhuis (1721-1790) who understood matter as “congealed mind,” a notion echoed 
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by Schelling in his statement that matter is “mind in a condition of dullness214.” We can 
assume that matter will be elevated to a higher state of being through the two subsequent 
epochs as Spirit further actuates its potentiality. 
The second epoch moves from productive intuition to reflection. During this 
epoch the self develops sensibility and begins to attain an awareness of external objects 
distinct from itself, if only at the level of the sensible215. In order for this basic sense of 
the objective to be possible this epoch contains the deduction of space, time, and 
causality; in effect, a world begins to exist for the self. This is in part achieved through 
the self’s reflection on its own nature. While the construction of the object (as matter) 
takes place during the first epoch, the second epoch attempts to explain how the self in 
the form of subject begins to distinguish itself from object. The distinction is 
accomplished through reflection, the end point of this epoch, and produces a conceptual 
separation between the self as subject and the self as object.  
Reflection, as a mode of the self, contains several “conditions.” The first is 
transcendental abstraction, which explains how the self begins its separation from its 
object by distinguishing between intuition and concept. Although abstraction 
accomplishes this first division, it does not account for how the two are then reunited 
under judgment so as to avoid the impression of an irreparable division suggesting two 
distinct and unrelated worlds, i.e. that of the object and that of the subject216. Schema 
connects intuition and concept and thereby intermediates outer and inner sense. To a 
certain degree, reflection introduces a temporary separation between a reflected object 
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(Nature) and a reflecting subject (the self); this is to establish the necessary conditions for 
the self to know itself. Schelling qualifies the self as that which “seeks itself, but in so 
doing actually flees from itself217.” In fleeing itself, the self establishes a degree of 
separation from itself as Nature; without positing object and subject, as the constituent 
elements of worldly being and knowledge, the self, and by extension Nature, cannot 
achieve its telos of becoming “wholly an object to herself218.” This sets the stage for the 
self’s realization of itself as a concretely existing being. 
Finally, the third epoch moves from reflection to the absolute act of will; at this 
stage the self has become fully an object to itself and seeks to fulfill itself in the objective 
world219. To this end, the third epoch is when the self discovers other selves and seeks to 
transform the objective world (Nature) in accordance with ideals it deduces from both 
itself and its newly found community of selves; in effect, this is the stage in which a 
social-political order becomes possible220. Because the ideals are deduced from the self, it 
is in effect attempting to realize itself, i.e. complete itself according to its inner telos221. 
This maintains the notion of self-manifestation; the highest end of the self is conformity 
to the law of manifestation. As the third epoch is defined by “the absolute act of the will,” 
manifestation is defined by concrete action in the world; in this respect, manifestation is 
no longer limited to the realm of the theoretical but becomes a practice of the self. 
Still within the bounds of the third epoch of selfhood, Schelling’s transcendental 
idealism culminates with a discussion of the nature of the work of art, what Schelling 
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describes as a “removal of the invisible barrier dividing the real from the ideal world222.” 
The self’s unconscious purposiveness is directed not only toward subjective or self-
centred ends (telos) but toward universal ends that concern both the growth and evolution 
of the natural world and the development and progress of humanity; the nature of these 
ends is most potently expressed in the work of art. Like Fichte, Schelling posits a 
dependent relation between theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy wherein the 
former precedes but is only completed by the latter; however, the significance of 
Schelling’s practical philosophy is not the same as Fichte’s. Fichte’s practical philosophy 
is primarily concerned with ethics and the determination of man’s moral constitution as 
an ethical being always striving to catch up with itself. For Schelling, in contrast, 
practical philosophy is aesthetic and is directed toward the creative production of world 
and self. In effect, Schelling argues that the ethical is grounded in the aesthetic because 
the latter better symbolizes the ground and production of world and subjectivity. The 
making of the subject and knowledge is like the making of a work of art not like the 
determination of a particular moral-political order, as was so important to Fichte both 
philosophically and personally. This is the major difference between the two practical 
philosophies. Schelling describes the aesthetic near the beginning of the System when he 
writes: 
In philosophizing, one is not simply the object of contemplation, but always at the 
same time the subject. Two conditions are therefore required for the understanding of 
philosophy, first that one be engaged in a constant inner activity, a constant 
producing of these original acts of the intellect; and second, that one be constantly 
reflecting upon this production; in a word, that one always remain at the same time 
both the intuited (the producer) and the intuitant223. 
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By attending to the production of the “original acts of the intellect” the self is actually 
attending to the production of herself, her own production. She is being made through the 
complex interaction of the real and ideal activities of the self, and of the self’s 
unconscious (necessary) and conscious (free) regions.  
Schelling returns to the nature of the aesthetic in the final pages of the treatise; as in 
the previous passage, he relates the aesthetic to the essential nature and task of 
philosophy: 
The whole of philosophy starts, and must start, from a principle which, as the 
absolute principle, is also at the same time the absolutely identical. An absolutely 
simple and identical cannot be grasped or communicated through description, nor 
through concepts at all. It can only be intuited. Such an intuition is the organ of all 
philosophy.—But this intuition, which is an intellectual rather than a sensory one, 
and has as its object neither the objective nor the subjective, but the absolutely 
identical, in itself neither subjective nor objective, is itself merely an internal one, 
which cannot in turn become objective for itself: it can become objective only 
through a second intuition. This second intuition is the aesthetic224. 
 
The notion of “intellectual intuition” mentioned in the above passage is not a cognitive 
act; it is not an intuition of something within empirical consciousness, nor is it empirically 
known or demonstrable. The kind of intuition in question is more obscure than that; it 
does not signify the awareness of an object, not even the self itself as object. Rather, this 
intuition is the self’s activity, the process of becoming; as such, this non-objective 
knowing, this intuition, is a part of the self’s activity. Schelling thus qualifies intellectual 
intuition as “a type of knowing utterly different from ordinary knowledge225.” It is 
“absolutely free” and defined by non-duality, i.e. it makes no absolute or relative 
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distinction between subject and object; it is “an intuition freely productive in itself, in 
which producer and produced are one and the same226.”  
Vater writes that intellectual intuition “is not merely an activity of, or a faculty in, 
the subject; it is the subject. The self is intellectual intuition subsistent; it exists by 
knowing itself in this non-objective manner227.” Vater also explains it as “an unconscious 
principle of consciousness; our awareness is always an intuition directed back upon a 
production, i.e. upon a production-intuition, an activity become objectified228.” If 
intellectual intuition is the self itself, it signifies both the self’s unconscious productivity 
as well as its conscious awareness of said productivity, from a vantage point where the 
two are grasped as “one and the same229.” Intellectual intuition is thus a “substrate to 
carry and support” transcendental philosophy and thinking; without it, the latter would 
simply not be possible230. Because the self is an object by virtue of knowing itself as such, 
Schelling calls the self “a permanent intellectual intuition231”; however, as such, the self’s 
knowledge and consciousness of itself and of Nature is fundamentally fragmented. This is 
because the self’s awareness of itself is never absolute, total and complete. It knows itself 
only from what is objectified and presented before it in finite consciousness. The 
intellectual intuition it seeks to know concretely and empirically cannot be objectified, 
but remains utterly non-objective and effectively unconscious. Intellectual intuition thus 
affords the self only an intimation of its full nature and leaves it with the frustrating and 
humbling realization that as consciousness the self is forever a fragmented and 
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incomplete reality; the self is a process, not a finished product. It should be clear then that 
the self conceptualized by Schelling is not identical with self-consciousness, nor is it a 
personal ego; rather, as McGrath aptly phrases it, “it is identical to the universe, 
containing within itself the forms of all things232.” The self (Spirit) is an expression of the 
Absolute; knowledge of this fact, according to Schelling, is afforded through intellectual 
intuition. 
Schelling does not stop there in attempting to articulate the identity of the Absolute 
relative to consciousness. In order to account for how intellectual intuition functions, as 
well as what it provides the self, Schelling resorts to an explanation of the aesthetic and 
the role of the philosophy of art relative to knowledge of the Absolute. The composition 
of a work of art (the aesthetic) is an analogy for Schelling. It signifies what is taking place 
in and through intellectual intuition, in the self itself, as it seeks itself in the form of self-
consciousness. An explanation of aesthetic production ensues where intellectual intuition 
leaves off; the former is how Schelling couches the genesis of self and phenomena from 
the transcendental standpoint. Schelling makes this clear near the beginning of the System 
when he writes: 
[…] this coming-to-be-reflected of the absolutely non-conscious and nonobjective is 
possible only through an aesthetic act of the imagination. This much, however, is 
apparent from what we have already shown, namely that all philosophy is 
productive. Thus philosophy depends as much as art does on the productive capacity, 
and the difference between them rests merely on the different direction taken by the 
productive force […] philosophical production is directed immediately inwards, so 
as to reflect it in intellectual intuition. The proper sense by which this type of 
philosophy must be apprehended is thus the aesthetic sense, and that is why the 
philosophy of art is the true organon of philosophy233. 
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The aesthetic is a form of production; its product is the work of art. Philosophy too is a 
form of production, or at least is dependent on the productive capacity; its product is 
knowledge of Nature and self-knowledge—a very Platonic (and Neoplatonic) ideal. The 
term “organon” identifies the role of art relative to philosophy; art is an instrument or 
principle through which to interpret what philosophy is and what it does. As such, the 
philosophy of art as organon of philosophy shows us that we are each involved and 
engaged, if only unconsciously, in an active construction of world, experience and self. 
Just as with art, to philosophize is to create a product, and, by extension, to exist is to 
create; this too is a Neoplatonic idea. Plotinus describes the process of self-manifestation 
and self-fulfillment by way of analogy to the art of sculpture234.  
Schelling’s transcendental perspective is similarly concerned with self-fulfillment; 
as is evident in the following passage: 
Transcendental philosophy is nothing else but a constant raising of the self to a 
higher power; its whole method consists in leading the self from one level of self-
intuition to another, until it is posited with all the determinations that are contained in 
the free and conscious act of self-consciousness235. 
 
For Schelling, the creative or artistic genius is the fulfillment, or symbol, of Spirit’s 
odyssey of self-manifestation. Again, at the primitive stage of manifestation, the first 
epoch of Spirit, the self generates world (Nature) and itself without making a formal 
distinction between the two. This represents a stage of unconscious production; it is a free 
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act, albeit not a conscious one. It is an action through which the self fulfills its inner 
necessity. At a later more developed stage of manifestation, the third epoch, the self 
becomes conscious of its capacity to generate Nature from out of itself; to a degree, it has 
become conscious of its unconscious (natural) productivity without knowing exactly what 
is to be produced. Moreover, at this stage, the self (as creative or artistic genius) 
consciously draws upon its inner necessity and potential to produce a freely created 
artificial work or product; this product is the work of art [or perhaps a system of 
philosophy]. Art is an extension of the self’s formation as both unconscious and 
conscious; it symbolizes the self’s drive to self-manifest—to produce itself. In this 
respect, it is a particular or relative manifestation of the self’s dual nature, i.e. both its 
inner necessity and its freedom. The work of art is a free-determination of the self; 
furthermore, the creative genius acts unconsciously with the same power that runs 
through Nature. This is the basis of the unity of the real and the ideal, that the power 
which runs unconsciously through Nature also acts consciously within the creative 
genius—the artist. The power of the artist produces what Coplestone calls “the supreme 
objectification” of the self to itself236. 
This reading of the System of Transcendental Idealism concludes that the primary 
goal of the treatise is to articulate the self’s process of manifestation, what Schelling calls 
the odyssey of Spirit237. The first condition is the self as activity or productivity—the 
postulate that put the “system” in motion. The second condition is the self’s dialectical 
nature, i.e. its manifestation through opposite aspects and tendencies. We might say that 
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the human being is the product whose producthood consists of an inner or spiritual 
orientation toward itself238, i.e., an opening up of the Absolute in which it becomes aware 
of itself as an existing reality. As Hegel put it, reflection reveals that the identity of the 
Absolute does not pass fully into its appearance (Nature, self)239 and yet the nature of 
product has no standing apart from productivity240. The being of the self as Absolute 
transcends its immanence throughout Nature; it gestures to that which Schelling describes 
as “the supreme absolute reality, which never itself becomes objective, but is the cause of 
everything that is so241.” The Absolute in-itself cannot be equated with Nature just as it 
cannot be equated with self-consciousness (Spirit) from the vantage point of 
Naturephilosophy. Nature and the self (Spirit) are aspects of the Absolute, that is relative 
ways in which the Absolute has elected, if only indifferently, to manifest. 
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4. Conclusion 
Of Nature and Spirit: The Inverted Identities of the Absolute 
 
 
For many years I sought to present the one philosophy that I know to be true from two wholly 
different sides—{both} as philosophy of nature and as transcendental philosophy242.  
–F.W.J. Schelling (1801) 
 
For the system that appears here for the first time in its fully characteristic shape is the same one 
that I always had in view in the different {earlier} presentations, which I constantly used as my 
personal guide-star in both transcendental and natural philosophy. I never concealed from myself 
or from others the fact that I take neither what I term ‘transcendental philosophy’ nor what I term 
‘philosophy of nature,’ each in isolation, to be the system of philosophy itself. Instead I 
announced in the clearest terms in the Preface to my System of {Transcendental} Idealism, in 
many places in this journal, etc., that I regard each of them as nothing more than a one-sided 
presentation of that system [...] I have always represented what I called philosophy of nature and 
transcendental philosophy as the opposite poles of philosophical activity. With the present 
exposition I situate myself at the indifference-point {between them}; only if one has previously 
constructed [philosophy] from completely antithetical directions can one correctly and confidently 
place oneself there243. 
–F.W.J. Schelling (1801) 
 
 
There are two distinct ontologico-epistemological narratives within Schelling’s early 
philosophy. The first is Naturephilosophy, constructed from the standpoint of Nature, and 
is characterized as the natural history of consciousness. The second is transcendental 
idealism, developed from the perspective of the self, and is formulated as the stages the 
self passes through en route to self-consciousness. To fuse them as a single narrative 
would be to lose what is original to Schelling, i.e. the binocular perspective of the 
Absolute from the vantage points of Nature, on one hand, and Spirit, on the other. There 
is no third philosophy produced for Schelling; there are only two philosophies, neither of 
which is adequate to explaining the nature of the Absolute. The best that Schelling can do 
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is to situate himself “at the indifference-point between” the two philosophies, which he 
attempts in his treatise Presentation of My System of Philosophy (1801)244. This is a 
significant point; it means that unity will not be established by erasing differences but by 
attempting to place oneself in a position from which the identity of differences can be 
thought out and formulated, if only provisionally. This thesis, therefore, does not argue 
that Naturephilosophy and transcendental idealism must be seen as one philosophy; rather 
they are aspects of and vantage points on the Absolute. This is why Schelling associates 
Nature with the self’s unconscious in the context of transcendental idealism; Nature is the 
manifestation of an invisible and indeterminate process of becoming constantly at work 
within the self.  
Schelling’s insistence on an underlying immediacy or original identity offers 
support to the interpretation, discussed in Chapter I, that from the standpoint of 
Naturephilosophy the self is the manifestation of Nature’s invisibility; and that the self 
and Spirit are ultimately projections—making visible—of Nature’s inner necessity and 
potency. In effect, there are two productivities, i.e. two distinct processes underway; one 
is signified by Nature and the other by the self and Spirit. They appear separate but are in 
fact simultaneous, presupposing one another245. We might say that the Absolute moves 
outward in the form of Nature (ad extra), and inward in the form of Spirit (ad intra)246. 
As we saw in Chapter I, the outward-inward movement of polarity defines the 
manifestation of all things in Nature; Chapter II showed that a similar, albeit inverted, 
dialectic applies to Spirit.  
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From the standpoint of Nature, polarity explains how Nature is visible Spirit and 
Spirit is invisible Nature247; and from the standpoint of Spirit, the self’s dialectic explains 
how Nature and Spirit are bound to one another. Nature and Spirit exist in a bond with 
one another of varying degrees of organic and spiritual potency. They are what we may 
call inverted identities or, alternatively, inverted potencies. Nature is Spirit in visible 
form, and Spirit is Nature in invisible form. This means that that which defines Nature as 
such also exists in Spirit albeit in exact inverse proportion; and the reverse is true of 
Nature relative to Spirit. Inverted relations are found throughout Schelling’s corpus; they 
are an inevitable result of explaining relations according to a base polarity or dialectic. 
 One later instance of potency-inversion appears in Schelling’s Stuttgart Seminars 
(1810) where he affirms the notion of “essentification,” which Schelling appropriates 
from the Swedish theologian Emanuel Swedenborg (1688-1772). Essentification is the 
theological doctrine that the physical body continues to exist after death but in a more 
essential spiritual form248. In effect, it posits the notion of spiritual corporeality. The 
spiritual body actually exists prior to death but in a latent or lower potency, i.e. a state of 
spiritual impurity due to the admixture of two principles, the spiritual and the material249. 
At death, an inversion occurs in which the material body and the spiritual body reverse 
their degrees of potency relative to one another. The material body, which existed in a 
higher state of potency in the material world, diminishes in proportion to the spiritual 
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body’s increase in potency. This position challenges the dualistic conception of two 
absolutely distinct worlds: the earthly, fallen world and the divine world beyond. 
Essentification posits that the two worlds, insofar as there are two, are continuous with 
one another separated only by a veil of mortality. Their difference, again, is accounted for 
by the degrees and intensity of potencies, both material and spiritual, not by an 
impenetrable divide between them. The idea of degrees of potency, signified by the two 
bodies and two worlds, mirrors Schelling’s description of life according to 
Naturephilosophy, where organic life is identified as a combination of receptivity-
activity. Moreover, the relation between the material and the spiritual bodies is defined by 
reciprocal determination such that if one stabilizes at a point of minimal potency, the 
other necessarily rises to a point of maximal potency in order to balance the relation. 
 
4.1 The Magnetic Model and the First Signs of Identityphilosophy 
It seems that the theme of “original magnetism,” presented in the First Outline of a 
System of the Philosophy of Nature (1799), persists in Schelling’s thinking after its initial 
formulation. The Stuttgart Seminars is one example, as is the earlier work Presentation of 
My System of Philosophy (1801) in which Schelling formulates a magnetic model of the 
Absolute (original identity): 
+      + 
A = B          A = B 
A = A 
The magnetic model signifies the division of the Absolute (original identity or A=A) into 
two distinct aspects, modalities, or tendencies and their grounding in a common point of 
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indifference. First, on the top-left portion of the model, there is a preponderance of what 
Schelling calls the “inward tendency250.” I take this to denote a spiritual inclination. 
Conversely, the top-right portion of the model represents the preponderance of the 
“outward tendency251.” Similarly, I take this to denote an organic or material element. 
Furthermore, the top-left and right equations show how Nature and Spirit actually contain 
a portion of the other, albeit in a latent state or at a lower degree of potency. The left-side, 
for instance, contains a higher degree of the spiritual relative to the material; this is 
represented by the (+) sign over the “A.” The inverse is true of the right-side, showing a 
higher degree of the material (+ sign over the B). Schelling’s magnetic model thus 
represents how Nature and Spirit are in fact inverted identities of one another: a single 
reality divided upon itself, reflecting its double-nature.  
 Drawing on a second Swedenborgian concept252, we might say that Schelling’s 
early philosophies of Nature and transcendental idealism explore and ultimately show the 
correspondence of Nature and Spirit253. This is manifest in Schelling’s magnetic model. 
Together the top-left and right tendencies compose the Absolute in manifest form. 
Grounding the manifestation of the Absolute is original identity (A=A) which pervades 
and abides the whole of the universe given that Schelling places it under all factors. If we 
interpret the world as the manifestation of difference, as I did in Chapter I, then the model 
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shows us that original identity (A=A) is the basis of what Schelling calls, circa 1801, 
“relative identity” (A=B). In other words, indifference grounds difference254.  
By bringing Nature and Spirit together within a working unity grounded by 
original identity, Schelling aims to overcome the fundamental ever-present rift between 
the objective and the subjective, necessarily introduced by the self in order to make self-
consciousness and knowledge of Nature possible. However, the point extends further as 
the goal is to think the difference of Nature and Spirit under the auspices of a single, 
overarching philosophical perspective, rather than from the eternally disparate vantage 
points of Naturephilosophy and transcendental idealism. Schelling himself affirms this 
goal in his 1801 treatise when he writes, “For many years I sought to present the one 
philosophy that I know to be true from two wholly different sides—{both} as philosophy 
of nature and as transcendental philosophy255.” Bringing the two philosophies to bear on 
one another, Coplestone describes Schelling’s early philosophy in the following way: 
“The life of representation is Nature’s knowledge of itself; it is the actualization of 
Nature’s potentiality, whereby slumbering Spirit awakens to consciousness256.” A 
succinct description of Schelling’s early philosophy might be: Nature awakens to itself 
through Spirit, and Spirit awakens to itself through Nature. The inverted relation hides the 
grounding identity—the indifference point—that links Nature and Spirit and thus 
connects the philosophy of Nature with the philosophy of Spirit through a philosophy of 
Identity. 
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5. Appendix 
A Consideration of Three Differences between 
 Schelling’s Philosophy and Hegel’s Philosophy 
 
According to Schelling’s early philosophy, there are potentially different infinities and 
different perspectives from which to explore and consider the nature of the Absolute. 
There is a subjective infinity, as outlined in the System of Transcendental Idealism 
(1800); there is also an objective infinity, as outlined in Naturephilosophy, in particular in 
the First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature (1799). Combining these two 
perspectives we might speculate about the possibility of a subjective-objective infinity in 
which the two co-appear simultaneously rather than as separate philosophies. To an 
extent this is how Hegel understands Schelling’s philosophy in his treatise The Difference 
Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy (1801).  
Hegel bases his comparison of Schelling to Fichte primarily on the former’s 
Presentation of My System of Philosophy (1801). The main difference between the two, 
according to Hegel, is that Fichte presents a system grounded on the subjective and 
constructs what amounts to a form of Subjective Idealism257. In contrast, Hegel identifies 
Schelling’s system as grounded in the identity of the subjective Subject-Object and the 
objective Subject-Object; the former signifies intelligence, consciousness and the ideal 
while the latter signifies Nature, unconsciousness and the real258. In short, Schelling’s 
system is a form idealism that takes its starting point from neither the subjective nor the 
objective but from their identity, what Schelling calls “the indifference-point259.” By the 
                                                
257 Hegel, Difference, 175. 
258 Ibid., 110. 
259 Schelling, “Presentation of My System of Philosophy,” 45. 
94 
 
end of his Difference treatise, Hegel comes out in favour of Schelling’s approach over 
Fichte’s and in the ensuing years post-1801 constructs his own brand of idealism that 
comes to be known as Absolute Idealism, claiming not to favour the subjective or the 
objective at the expense of the other. Although Hegel’s idealism works from a similar 
basis as Schelling presents in his 1801 treatise, there are significant differences between 
their philosophies. In this appendix, I will explore three of those differences, specifically 
1) a difference of logic; 2) a difference concerning reason’s access to its ground; and 3) a 
difference concerning the role of immediacy in knowledge. 
As has been demonstrated over the course of this thesis, Schelling’s Absolute is 
neither Nature nor Spirit on its own. Taking stock of both Naturephilosophy and 
transcendental idealism, the subjective and the objective stand over and against one 
another; this is what makes Schelling’s early philosophy fundamentally dualistic. From 
the vantage point of Naturephilosophy, Nature is the positive driving force of all 
becoming; its productivity makes possible all existents culminating with the self and 
Spirit. Conversely, transcendental idealism posits Nature as a counter power to Spirit 
through which the latter produces self-consciousness. Although Nature is posited by the 
self from out of the latter’s infinite productivity, it is also the sign of a deeper reality on 
which both the self and Nature depend: the Absolute which seeks manifestation through 
Spirit. Generally, Schelling’s transcendental idealism can be conceived as a philosophy 
that attempts to explain Nature in terms of the externalization of Spirit; conversely, 
Naturephilosophy can be conceived as a philosophy that explains Spirit in terms of the 
internalization of Nature.  
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In contrast to Schelling, Hegel wants to take the distinction between 
Naturephilosophy and transcendental idealism further by positing a higher philosophy 
that is the unity (synthesis) of the two. Schelling, adopting a position influenced by 
Neoplatonism, leaves the distinction and its unresolved tension intact in order not to 
violate the law of non-contradiction. For Schelling, there is an unresolved dyadic 
structure in the ground of logic, what S. J. McGrath terms a Socratic aporia260. The 
aporia produces a disjunction of logical opposites: for example, Nature and Spirit, object 
and subject, real and ideal. The aporia is another feature of Schelling’s [early] dualism; 
its purpose is twofold: 1) to identify logical oppositions, and 2) to produce, even reveal, 
the tension between oppositions, which, in turn, forces a decision. The aporia itself stops 
short of making a decision, leaving the matter to the individual will. On this very point 
McGrath writes: “Schellingian opposites, the real and the ideal, freedom and necessity, 
good and evil, the universal and the individual, like a Socratic aporia, do not resolve 
themselves: on the contrary, they create a crisis261.” By creating a crisis at the heart of the 
individual, logic sets the stage for decision and action, which are the domains of the will. 
Just as we saw with Nature and Spirit in Chapters I and II, respectively, the crucial point 
for Schelling is that true becoming, production and manifestation is something that must 
be actively brought forth. 
The consequence of Schelling’s logical aporia is that complete and total 
knowledge of the Absolute is not possible; the Absolute cannot be grasped by way of a 
logical concept. For Schelling then, the temptation to close gaps in our knowledge and 
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comprehension of the world with concepts insufficient to reality is disrupted. We might 
say that Schelling’s adherence to the inviolability of the laws of logic disrupts “system”—
or the temptation to systematization, i.e. strict rational determination—rather than 
completes it. In contrast to Schelling’s maintenance of logical tension and aporia, Hegel 
seeks to overcome and reconcile the tension in a higher unity. From Hegel’s perspective, 
logic does not have to limit itself to the kind of disjunction implied by Schelling’s 
aporetic logic; it can actually move passed the disjunction toward a unity or conjunction 
of opposites. This is the basis of Hegel’s logic of sublation (Aufheben). The logical goal 
then is to push further the quest for a single philosophical principle and system. Hegel 
concludes that Schelling provides a blueprint for this project but fails to complete it. 
Schelling and Hegel’s philosophical projects are further differentiated by their 
respective ideas concerning reason’s access to its ground, i.e. reason’s own capacity to 
articulate its principle as well as the nature of the Absolute. This point may be the key 
difference between the two thinkers as it connects the above point about logic with a third 
point concerning immediacy, to be discussed below. First, let us consider reason’s access 
to itself (its ground). In essence, the difference comes down to this: for Schelling, reason 
depends on something other than reason to be, whereas for Hegel, reason depends on 
itself, on its own negation and affirmation (dialectic). This means that “synthesis” is 
differently understood by the two thinkers. For Hegel, there is a merging of two elements 
to create a third that is the synthesis of the two more primitive elements. This third 
element then initiates a new dialectic at a higher or more developed level of being. Thus, 
every synthesis is a new thesis that produces its own antithesis, which, in turn, produces a 
new synthesis. In Hegel’s own terminology, this development produces the “concrete 
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universal,” reason’s self-mediated product. The concrete universal combines the best 
parts of a previous dialectical impasse that pitted a universal category against a particular 
category. In themselves, these categories cease to be once reason has exercised its 
inexhaustible capacity to synthesize what first seemed incompatible and 
incommensurable. Hegel regards this logical sequence as necessary and rational; through 
it, historical and organic development proceed according to a program guided by reason’s 
capacity to conceptualize (grasp) reality (the real)262.  
For Schelling, synthesis is an intermediation of two elements that never merge or 
mix; rather they produce something new by the very fact of their interaction and 
intermediation. It is as if the two elements are in conversation with one another; it is an 
event of communion and communication. For Hegel, one gets the sense that if there is a 
conversation taking place it is one with an image reflected in a mirror. Hegel himself 
admits this; he writes “An out-and-out Other simply does not exist for Mind263.” This 
passage leaves one with the impression that there is no true outside for the subject (Spirit, 
Mind) so far as Hegel is concerned. Consequently, everything is taken to be a part of 
Spirit, part of its interiority (for there is no true Other outside it)264. This point contrasts 
with Schelling’s insistence that there is indeed something outside of the subject and 
outside of reason’s purview. These two differing positions on the interiority and 
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exteriority of reason extend further to Schelling and Hegel’s respective ideas on the role 
of immediacy as a condition for the possibility of knowledge.  
Drawing on a distinction made by Andrew Bowie265, we might say that Hegel 
seeks “a complete conceptual account of how mind and world relate,” whereas Schelling 
appeals to a “non-conceptual” form of intuition to provide the basis for conceptual 
knowing266. Schelling’s emphasis on intuition leads him to posit art as the “organon of 
philosophy,” and the work of art is interpreted as a sign of the necessary, albeit 
indeterminate, identity between the subjective and the objective. Schelling asserts that 
this is the case because the work of art is made from out of an unconscious productivity, 
which is only transformed, not sublated, by the light of intelligence and conscious 
productivity. This is not to say that the conscious renders the unconscious conscious, but 
that the unconscious as such receives some manner of expression through conscious 
productivity. In other words, the work of art is not itself a conceptual product; rather, it is 
a non-conceptual manifestation of the link between the unconscious and the conscious 
aspects of the self. As a non-conceptual manifestation, the work of art cannot be reduced 
or exhausted by conceptual analysis; new and different interpretations always remain 
possible. As Bowie suggests, the work of art is, therefore, not principally an object of 
knowledge but a symbol of the primordial relation between object and subject, Nature and 
Spirit, manifested in self-consciousness.  
Extending this point further, Schelling’s philosophy begins from an immediate 
identity, i.e. that which requires only itself as necessary and sufficient conditions of 
                                                
265 Bowie, German Philosophy, 42-50. 
266 Ibid., 42. 
99 
 
existence267. In contrast, Hegel argues that philosophy cannot begin with a predetermined 
identity, even something determined in and of itself, but must determine each and all of 
its components and stages of knowing through philosophical analysis; only then can the 
objects of knowledge be qualified as such. This is, in fact, according to Hegel, the sole 
task of philosophy. In this respect, Hegel argues that philosophy’s beginning point, 
although apparently immediate, is, by necessity, always mediate, i.e. always a product of 
dialectical becoming, a process through which the knowing subject seeks itself in ever-
higher syntheses of the objective (the real) and the subjective (the ideal or rational). For 
Hegel, a thing’s apparent immediacy is actually arrived at by mediation268. We might say 
that for Hegel the ground of knowledge is rational; it is the law of reason itself. For 
Schelling, the ground is pre-rational, meaning it precedes reason and is hidden from 
reason’s conceptualizing gaze. The fact that Hegel conceives of all knowledge as the 
product of mediation suggests that if there were an immediate principle or ground prior to 
mediation it would nonetheless be lifted up and completely absorbed by the process of 
becoming; its immediacy would be erased through becoming. Thus, no “original 
identity,” as articulated by Schelling, is present in Hegel’s philosophy. That which may 
have begun in a state of immediacy is for Hegel unknowable and could only ever be 
knowable on the condition that it is caught in the dialectical stream of becoming. In 
contrast, Schelling argues that there must be an original identity, if only through 
intellectual intuition, and that it shines through the fragmentary state of all things. By 
following the law of non-contradiction, Schelling maintains a distinction between being 
                                                
267 Ibid., 46. 
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and knowledge (thinking) and attempts to explain the connection between the two by way 
of an intermediation that is necessarily grounded in immediate identity. Hegel, on the 
other hand, seems to collapse the difference between being and thinking such that the 
self’s (or Subject) rationalization of the real is synonymous with its being. This is why 
Hegel’s philosophy is often referred to as a form of “pan-logicism”; it is also what leads 
Hegel to conclude, as he does in the Philosophy of Right, that the rational is the real, 
implying that the self is both Subject and substance of its self-given philosophical task269. 
In other words, the self is mediation; what it mediates is itself. A curious reversal thus 
arises: because Schelling’s philosophy is grounded in the immediate, i.e. the 
indeterminate, the self comes to see itself as an ongoing process of manifestation (a kind 
of mediation) dependent on something other, i.e. original identity. In other words, the self 
recognizes that its nature will never be fully grasped. In contrast, Hegel’s concept of the 
self appears completely self-sufficient because it has been endowed from the outset with 
all of the powers of mediation; its nature, then, is, at least potentially, immediately at its 
disposal and the world entirely within its grasp270. The only task that remains is to 
discover it through analysis. 
  
                                                
269 G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, trans. by T.M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
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